The Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index (SCORE) for the English-Speaking Caribbean 2024

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We hope this report serves as a valuable tool for policymakers, practitioners, and communities in fostering social cohesion, resilience, and inclusion across the region.

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Executive Summary

The Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index (SCORE) for the English-speaking Caribbean 2024, resulting on survey data from 3,073 respondents across seven countries in the subregion (The Bahamas, Belize, Dominica, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago), provides a comprehensive analysis of social cohesion and its critical dimensions, such as intergroup relations, civic behaviour, and gender equality. Designed through a participatory process, the SCORE identifies root drivers of key issues and entry points for transformative change using predictive analyses. It serves as a data-driven tool for policymakers, development actors, and communities, enabling evidence-based strategies, targeted interventions, and resource mobilization. Supporting SDGs 5, 10, and 16, the SCORE fosters resilience, addresses inequalities, and promotes sustainable peace, with the vision of becoming a recurring and accessible societal resource for advancing social cohesion and empowering communities in the region.

- **Intergroup relations and community cooperation is high in the Caribbean, but trust to out-groups is lower. A highly localised approach is needed.**

People in the Caribbean hold positive and accepting views of people from other ethnic groups, religions, regions or political orientations and no serious fractures emerge. However, although feelings are positive, trust scores lower. The SCORE has identified entry-points to build intergroup trust which tend to be impactful in all contexts and for all groups, such as intergroup social contact, and the accessibility of public space, implying grass-roots interpersonal interaction across social groups is key. However, each community or area will have its own flash points for tensions, or drivers of trust. When designing trust-building interventions in communities, use the factors emerging from the analysis as a starting point, then conduct a community-specific mapping of potential factors affecting trust and social relationships. The relative strengths and relevance of the factors identified in this report are expected to vary wildly depending on the context.

- **Although large-scale social tensions to not exist between the large ethnic, religious, or political groups, there are smaller marginalised or fragile groups which face rejection from the broader community. Consider acceptance campaigns for each of these groups, while ensuring that service-providers are not excluding them.**

On average, across the region, between four and five people out of ten would prefer that drug users, sex workers, LGBTQ+ people leave their community entirely. Further, there is a segment of society which avoids interacting people with mental disabilities, people living with HIV, immigrants, migrants, and unemployed youth. These groups face marginalisation and potentially social exclusion. Investing in groups to advocate for the just access to services, and human rights of such groups should be a priority. SCORE data can also disaggregate levels of acceptance per country, or among certain demographic groups, to help target such campaigns.

- **Economic security and social mobility affect all dimensions of social cohesion. To ensure social mobility, work on cohesion within families and communities, as well as a feeling of safety and security in communities.**

Across all chapters, socioeconomic disparities appear as a recurring challenge. Lower levels of economic security and opportunity are linked with reduced social mobility, more individual violent attitudes, and distrust in social outgroups. Economic inclusion is foundational not only for personal advancement but also for broader social harmony and cooperation. To achieve greater social mobility, economic development is of course needed, but so are enabling factors like community cohesion, community security, and family harmony. As such, a supportive and safe family and community environment should be seen as a resilience factor to ensure economic growth, particularly for those who are underprivileged or economically excluded. Interventions working to improve the economic situation (such as entrepreneurship, employability, or up-skilling interventions) of the underprivileged should integrate assessments of a participant's family and community environment, and offer solutions to address issues. Success in such interventions depends on a wider enabling environment within each person's family and community. Family counselling, community livelihoods initiatives, and reinforcing neighbourhood solidarity could be helpful dimensions of a more robust economic mobility intervention.

- **An engaged citizenry, both in community solidarity and in civic and political processes, is key for a socially cohesive and resilient society. Key entry points, which should be included in strategies for more engaged citizens must include building family cohesion, intergroup contact, a sense of agency, and more frequent presence of leaders in the community.**

Consider organising more opportunities for interaction with local leaders and ensuring that leaders live up to their role as enablers of others to participate for civic action. Intervening on key influencers may be an efficient starting point. Initiatives could also include inclusive town hall meetings, community forums, and educational programs on civic responsibility. Establish or refurbish community centres, especially in areas with low access to such spaces, and ensure that they are also youth-friendly, digitally connected, and accessible to marginalised groups. Interestingly, exposure to violence is also a motivating factor driving community solidarity and civic engagement. This implies that communities are resilient and organise themselves around issues which they consider to be a threat.

- **To reduce the willingness of using violence, work on improving mental health, domestic abuse, and limiting cycles of violence.**

Violent Attitudes are low overall, but do exist within a potentially disruptive minority, as discussed in Chapter 2, section 2. Although enablers of violence, such as the presence of weapons or gangs in a community play a role in generating violent tendencies, the main root causes of violent attitudes among individuals include mental wellbeing indicators, and past and present experiences of domestic violence. Those who experienced a safe childhood, and current family harmony are much less likely to normalise violence or use it in interpersonal or social situations, or to advance their political aims. Preventative initiatives to build community security and limit violence before it emerges should integrate family cohesion, mental health, and domestic violence into their planning. Building cohesive attitudes such as intergroup harmony and support for gender equality are also associated with lower acceptance of violence, implying a link across the dimensions of social cohesion.

- **Although there is support for gender equality in the region, there are still many sceptics. Men and women sceptics should be approached differently. Younger women are becoming more progressive than their mothers on gender equality, but young men are not becoming more progressive than their fathers.**

Male sceptics tend to be more aggressive, more concerned about crime, and hold more authoritarian values. Women sceptics hold less positive attitudes towards other religions, and are older. Awareness campaigns and strategies to increase support should consider these demographic findings and focus on men – particularly those aged under 35. Empower leading figures to take a positive stance on gender equality to convince those less supportive of gender equality. Trusted figures from law enforcement may be influential for sceptical men, while religious leaders for sceptical women. Integrate gender equality and social tolerance into school curricula and public awareness campaigns. Belize's relatively high tolerance levels could be studied and emulated to improve inclusion of marginalised groups, including LGBTQ+ individuals and those with disabilities, across the region.

- **Individual and family mental health and wellbeing is a prerequisite for many dimensions of social cohesion. Efficient and flexible provision of mental health services, based on in-depth assessments of specific challenges, would strongly improve outcomes.**

Individuals with better mental wellbeing tend to show more constructive civic behaviours, lower violent tendencies, and higher levels of trust to social outgroups. This points to the importance of mental health support as part of social cohesion initiatives, indicating that wellbeing is not only a personal but a societal asset that supports harmony and participation. Provide funding for mobile mental health services, especially underserved rural areas. These would offer counselling, arrange community support groups and referrals to specialised care. Workshops teaching coping skills, mental resilience targeting young people, economically disadvantaged individuals, and marginalised communities could be impactful. Further, such groups would benefit from financial subsidies for their mental health services.

Furthermore, although the SCORE contains several indicators on mental wellbeing, it is not a survey of specific mental health issues, traumas, or disorders. Conduct such studies to understand the prevalence of specific clusters of mental issues in the Caribbean, and design mental health strategies which can transform communities, particularly those affected by violence.

- **Recognise and prioritise work at the community level, leveraging community strengths to achieve progress on selected outcomes.**

In interventions on all kinds of themes, increase the focus of work at the community level. The SCORE findings corroborate the central importance of community dynamics and neighbourhood relations of support and solidarity, which affect and underpin progress on social cohesion and intergroup relations, economic opportunities and social mobility, and efforts towards violence reduction. Given high community cooperation and intergroup harmony, these strengths can be leveraged to enact change. They are a source of resilience and a kind of social capital unique to the Caribbean, which can be build upon. Interventions

for cohesion and development should identify and engage with informal and formal leaders of communities, and bring them, and their strong informal community networks, on board, to amplify change.

- **Use the SCORE on a more granular level to understand specificities at the national level, or profiles of demographic or social groups, to deliver more tailored interventions, depending on the strengths and weaknesses of each disaggregation.**

Many conclusions and findings are generalisable and applicable to all countries in the sample, and all social subgroups. However, impact will be greater if strategies and interventions are deployed with knowledge of the target group's profile. By reviewing the SCORE data for granular groups of interest, efforts can become more effective and context-sensitive.

- **Advocate for the deeper integration of rigorous evidence into development interventions, social cohesion work, and policy design.**

UN agencies, governments, international organisations and other actors interested in more impactful interventions, should integrate rigorous granular evidence streams like the SCORE into programmatic design, prioritisation of initiatives, strategies, and frameworks for SDG progress. Interventions and programmes can be tailored to specific countries, and incorporate key entry points, to achieve their goals, based on what has been discovered by the SCORE.

Introducing the SCORE Caribbean

The Caribbean is generally overlooked in global or regional studies, with few evidence-based data disaggregated at a granular level. At best, the region is lumped together with Latin America, or data from larger Caribbean countries, is generalised for the entire sub-region with little effort to understand smaller Caribbean countries. In the social cohesion sector of, the Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index (SCORE) rectifies this, by providing data, insights, analyses and key messages using robust data from 3,073 people across seven countries in the region – the Bahamas, Belize, Dominica, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago. This data is innovative not only because it covers a wide range of indicators that are used to present different predictive models to build social cohesion in the subregion, but also because it provides data to countries with limited updated and available data, useful for programme design and policy-making both at the subregional and national level.

The need for the SCORE Caribbean is highlighted by the worrying deterioration of certain social dynamics in the region: seven countries from the subregion are within the ten most violent countries in the world[1], 46% of women have experienced violence[2], and unemployment in the subregion is double the world average[3]. This panorama has been exacerbated by the multiple external threats faced by people in the subregion, from the effects of COVID-19 to the ongoing economic struggles, and the continuous exposure to hurricanes, and other natural disasters. These adversities weaken the social fabric, threaten institutional functioning, and ultimately undermine people's wellbeing. Social cohesion, being the strength of community bonds and the horizontal glue of social solidarity, may be contributing to the region's resilience in the face of these adversities. Hence, it is important to understand social cohesion and identify ways to strengthen it. What does a socially cohesive Caribbean look like? And more importantly, how can a cohesive Caribbean be achieved? In this study, we provide recommendations, key findings and the answers to these questions.

The Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index for the English-Speaking Caribbean (SCORE Caribbean), funded by the Joint UNDP-DPPA Programme on Building National Capacities for Conflict Prevention (Joint UNDP-DPPA Programme), gathers the voices of 3,703 individuals from seven countries in the subregion, with the goal to explore and untangle multiple layers of social indicators, and to offer potential recommendations towards a more peaceful, resilient, thriving, and ultimately cohesive Caribbean society. In this sense, this report provides policymakers and relevant stakeholders, from the United Nations system and other international organisations, civil society organisations, and local peacebuilding practitioners, with tools and information to build social cohesion in the sub-region by offering data useful to monitor and track multiple social dynamics, and by uncovering entry points to build to improve the social fabric of the sub-region. The analyses presented in this study are based on representative samples, large enough to be disaggregated into detailed

[1] UNODC. (2022). Intentional homicide.
[2] UN Women. (2019). Caribbean Women Count.
[3] ILO. (2024). Unemployment.

subgroups, thus allowing for a granular understanding of the societies in the sample. Further, the predictive analyses uncover root causes and drivers which impact outcomes of interest, thus giving clear evidence of which entry points should be targeted to most effectively achieve social change.

Social Cohesion in the Caribbean

Based on multiple consultations with local stakeholders as well as previous sub-regional research, the SCORE Caribbean imagines a cohesive society in the Caribbean as one where: 1) communities are inclusive, such that people have harmonious relationships with one another, and the social and economic inclusion of everyone is guaranteed; 2) people are willing and able to participate in civic and political processes in a constructive, non-violent, and democratic spirit; and 3) all genders have access to the same rights and opportunities, and violence and barriers which affect women, men, LGBTQ+ people and other marginalised groups are addressed. From this definition, the SCORE Caribbean has been designed as a tool with three dimensions of inquiry, each focussing on addressing one of the following broad aspects of cohesion. The SCORE recognises the overlapping inter-relatedness of these social issues and will analyse how factors are connected.

Inclusive Communities

The first dimension examines issues around inclusion to achieve social and economic development. It investigates intergroup relations by measuring social proximity, positive feelings and intergroup trust among several groups, to identify and understand where tensions might lie. Furthermore, it explores socioeconomic inclusion, focussing on improving the social mobility of the economically marginalised. Using SCORE data, this report presents two predictive models to improve inclusion. The first model focuses on Intergroup Trust as an outcome and identifies those predictors that build it. The second model takes Social Mobility as the outcome and discovers the predictors that improve it, especially among underprivileged people with lower wealth.

Some of the research questions that this chapter explores are:

- What are the levels of Intergroup Harmony, and its sub-indicators, in the sub-region?
- What cohesion-building factors or connectors build intergroup harmony? Which stressors lead to tensions that might undermine it?
- In which areas, and about which groups, are risky fractures apparent troubling tensions rising?
- Which demographic and socio-economic groups report high levels of marginalisation, and lack of economic opportunities?

Constructive Civic Behaviour

The second dimension explores the attitudes and behaviours of individuals to positively participate in their community, and to analyse the factors that predict individual violent tendencies. In this sense, this dimension focuses on two different predictive models. One offers data to reduce Individual Violent Attitudes (a meta indicator of the Aggression, Political Violence, and Tendency towards Violence SCORE indicators), and the second one

introduces a model focused on the Community Cooperation and Civic Engagement indicators, indicators of active citizenship, to reveal the indicators that build them.

Some of the research questions that this chapter explores are:

- What are the levels of civic engagement and community cooperation in the subregion? And what are the forms of civic, social, political and communal engagement people participate in?
- What drivers lead to higher levels of constructive civic behaviour? What stressors undermine, or what barriers limit constructive civic behaviour?
- Which demographic and socio-economic groups report high levels of civic engagement? Which ones report lower levels of engagement?
- What are the levels of Individual Violent Attitudes?
- Which factors increase or decrease individual likelihood to engaged in different types of violence?

Gender Equality and Diversity

The third dimension investigates the level of support for gender equality, and the barriers societies face to achieve gender equality, acknowledging the different needs of men and women. It also looks into the differences between young women and young men, whose life experiences are not only different to their older counterparts but also between them. We also present analyses which isolate and identify the characteristics associated with people who are more progressive on gender equality mindset compared to those who are more sceptical. These characteristics are disaggregated between men and women, revealing different factors associated with progressive men and progressive women, which may reveal entry points for convincing men and women to become more supportive of gender equality. The SCORE's Support for Gender Equality and Diversity indicator is made up of three sub-indicators: Support for Gender Equality Policies, Support of Gender stereotypes, and Positive Attitudes towards LGBTQ people.

Some of the research questions that this chapter explores are:

- What are the levels of support for gender equality, gender rights, and various forms of gender roles?
- What social and economic factors relate to support or opposition for gender equality or gender roles?
- What are the particular barriers or forms of marginalisation that women face across the region? Which capacities, skills, or community bonds are more prevalent among women?

Figure 1. Conceptual design of SCORE for the English-speaking Caribbean, showing the three research dimensions and outcome indicators for each statistical model.

This report dedicates a chapter to each dimension presenting the different statistical models designed around each outcome indicator. Each chapter also introduces the different positive and negative factors that predict them, including a wide set of SCORE indicators such as social, economic, contextual, community, institutional, and psychological ones. This allows the provision of specific recommendations per chapter to build social cohesion, based on each research dimension and their outcome indicators.

SCORE Caribbean and UN frameworks: working together to accelerate the SDGs

The SCORE Caribbean was designed to fluidly integrate into the global and subregional frameworks of the UN system. First, it is aligned to the United Nations Multi-Country Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (MSDCF) for the English- and Dutch-Speaking Caribbean 2022-2026, which is a key planning tool for achieving the 2030 Agenda[4]. SCORE findings should inform decision-making and facilitate programme design for initiatives focussing on two of the four pillars of the MSDCF: 1) Equality, Well-being & Leaving No One Behind, and 2) Peace, Safety, Justice and Rule of Law. Furthermore, SCORE data contains data on groups that have been included within the MSDCF as groups of people at risk of being left behind, such as women, migrants, LGBTQ people, people with disabilities, and people living in poor and rural areas.

[4] UN. (2022). United Nations Multi-Country Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (MSDCF) for the English- and Dutch-Speaking Caribbean 2022-2026.



Figure 2. United Nations Multi-Country Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (MSDCF) for the English- and Dutch-Speaking Caribbean 2022-2026.

Secondly, the SCORE is closely aligned with the SDG framework and can be used to accelerate the SDGs, first by offering data that can be used to measure, monitor, and track the progress of specific SDG targets. Secondly, it can be used to identify entry points to achieve SDGs through the different predictive models and other statistical analyses contained in this report. The following table shows the link between SCORE dimensions, the SDGs that SCORE Caribbean covers, and how it can be useful to accelerate the SDGs.

SCORE Dimension	SDG of interest	How does SCORE helps to accelerate the SDGs?
Inclusive Communities	SDG 10: Reduced Inequalities	Analysis on social mobility, to facilitate the inclusion of marginalised individuals, and analysis on intergroup trust, to improve the intergroup harmony of different groups, as well as data on marginalisation and tolerance towards minorities, add to goals of SDG 10, by offering data that addresses the existing social (target 10.3) and economic inequalities (target 10.2), as well as potential entry points to reduce them.
Constructive Civic Behaviour	SDG 16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions	Analysis on Individual Violent Attitudes, to prevent violence and foster peace in the subregion, data on violence and citizen security, and analysis on Community Cooperation and Civic engagement are useful to inform, monitor, and design programmes aimed to reduce violence and promote peace (Target 16.1), and to promote civic participation (Target 16.7).
Gender Equality and Diversity	SDG 5: Gender Equality	Data on the different forms of discrimination (target 5.1) and violence (target 5.2) that women and LGBTQ people face, are useful to inform policies and programmes that focus on address SDG 5. Also, the gender profiles explore the different barriers that men and women experience, which are also useful to identify and target specific groups to build gender equality.

Table 1. Table on the link between SCORE Caribbean Dimensions and the SDGs.

Although the design and statistical analysis of SCORE focus on these three SDGs, the results of several indicators can be used to monitor, support, and/or design programmes related to achieving other SDGs. For example, socio-economic indicators (such as Economic and Food Security, Economic Privilege, Social Mobility, and Subjective Poverty) and analyses that link them to the improvement of people's living conditions are relevant for SDG1 No Poverty and SDG2 Zero Hunger. Moreover, mental health related indicators and analysis (such as the multiple indicators in Individual Violent Attitudes, Depression and Anxiety, and Well-being) are useful for SDG3 Good Health and Well-being). In this sense, by measuring, tracking, and informing programmes and policies in the subregion SCORE Caribbean becomes a tool for accelerating the achievement of the SDGs and 2030 agenda. The SCORE Caribbean aligns also with the UN's New Agenda for Peace by providing data-driven insights to prevent violence, foster social cohesion, and address inequalities. SCORE contributes to achieving sustainable peace and advancing the Agenda's priorities in the Caribbean region[5].

About SCORE Caribbean

Methodology

Data collection and sample design

The SCORE Index[6] Caribbean was implemented in 2023-2024 by the Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development (SeeD)[7] in partnership with the United Nations through the Caribbean-Region Peace and Development Unit.

The SCORE Caribbean relies on data from the Bahamas, Belize, Dominica, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (SVG), and Trinidad and Tobago (T&T). Data collection was carried out by Data Point Solutions, based in Saint Lucia.

A total sample of 3,073 citizens from these seven countries of the English-speaking Caribbean were surveyed, using a quantitative face-to-face interview. Data was collected between 29th October 2023 and 29th January 2024. The mean interview duration was 1 hour.

Sampling strategies were developed for each of the seven countries based on the most recent data available from national census data or population estimates. The samples were representative of gender, age and for each major administrative area. Communities and respondents were randomly selected to participate in the survey.

Due to accessibility difficulties in the Bahamas, only New Providence and Grand Bahama were surveyed, and in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines only Saint Vincent was surveyed.

The margin of error at national level was ±4% for Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago (sample sizes 601 and 598, Table 2), and ±5% for the remaining countries (sample sizes 368 to 388, Table 2.

[5] UN. (2023). A New Agenda for Peace.
[6] For more about the SCORE methodology, visit app.scoreforpeace.org/en/methodology
[7] For more about SeeD, see seedsofpeace.eu

Table 2: Unweighted sample size for the SCORE Caribbean by demographic group.

	Total	Bahamas	Belize	Dominica	Jamaica	St. Lucia	SVG	T&T
Men	1508	179	180	189	297	179	185	299
Women	1565	195	188	199	304	193	187	299
18 to 29	875	103	128	131	174	93	96	150
30 to 49	1306	164	158	171	247	163	154	249
50+	892	107	82	86	180	116	122	199
Urban	1502	374	196	115	299	218	59	241
Rural	1571	0	172	273	302	154	313	357
Total	3073	374	368	388	601	372	372	598

Demographics

Data was weighted to ensure proportionality in terms of gender, age and settlement type within each country and the seven-country subregional total, and to ensure the proportionality of each country towards the seven-country subregional total. The weighted sample distribution is outlined in Table 3. The raw, unweighted sample collected is outlined in Table 2.

Table 3: Weighted sample distribution for the SCORE Caribbean.

	Total	Bahamas	Belize	Dominica	Jamaica	St. Lucia	SVG	T&T
Men	49%	48%	50%	51%	49%	49%	51%	50%
Women	51%	52%	50%	49%	51%	51%	49%	50%
18 to 29	27%	26%	35%	24%	27%	22%	27%	25%
30 to 49	41%	38%	44%	40%	40%	43%	40%	41%
50+	33%	36%	21%	36%	33%	36%	33%	34%
Urban	51%	100%	53%	29%	50%	58%	16%	40%
Rural	49%	0%	47%	71%	50%	42%	84%	60%

The SCORE process

The SCORE Caribbean was designed using a mixed-methods participatory research approach, outlined in Figure 3. This included multi-level stakeholder and expert consultations with civil society, academia, local and international practitioners, to calibrate indicators and design the study, which took part from November 2022 to June 2023. Following data collection from 3,073 (collected from December 2023 to February 2024) individuals and statistical analysis, results were shared from May to August 2024 and reviewed with key local stakeholders to validate findings and interpret results, to ensure local ownership and uptake of the results, and to maximise positive impact.



Figure 3: Outline of the SCORE process

How to read SCORE

The SCORE Caribbean quantifies the levels of societal phenomena using indicators based on questions from the face-to-face SCORE survey. Using several questions to create one indicator allows us to reliably measure that phenomenon from different perspectives. Scores for each indicator are given a value from 0 to 10, where 0 corresponds to the total absence of a phenomenon in an individual, country or in the subregion, and 10 corresponds to its strong presence.

Heatmaps, such as the one shown here, give the score achieved by each country in our sample in that indicator. The larger circles indicate the country score, and the smaller circles show the score of men and women in each country.

For example, the indicator **Personal Security** shown here, is measured using **five** questions, on a scale from 1 to 4 from "*Not at all*" to "*Yes, very much*":

1. *Do you feel safe from violence in your daily life, including domestic violence and/or sexual harassment?*
2. *Do you feel children in your community are safe from violence?*
3. *Do you feel confident that the police or other institutions (social worker, family doctor) can protect you from violence?*
4. *Would you feel safe walking alone in the street at night?*
5. *Do you believe the justice system is effective in dealing with crime?*

The responses are then summed and rescaled from 0 to 10 to give the scores shown on the map in Figure 4.



Figure 4: Heatmap of Personal Security, mean scores shown on a scale from 0 to 10.

Moreover, SCORE Caribbean's statistical predictive models provide valuable insights for program design by addressing three critical questions: *what*, *where*, and *who*. These analyses identify *what* issues need attention by highlighting the indicators most crucial for building social cohesion, *where* these indicators are weakest to prioritize specific countries, and *who* the vulnerable groups are that require targeted interventions.

Report Outline

This report is divided in three thematic sections dedicated to each research dimension. The first chapter discusses the Inclusive Communities dimension and is divided in two sections. The first section focuses on Intergroup Harmony and Trust, and the second on Social Mobility. The second thematic chapter discusses the Constructive Civic Behaviour dimension, comprised of two sections, the first one on Individual Violent Attitudes, and the second one on Civic Engagement and Community Cooperation. The third thematic chapter presents the Gender Equality and Diversity dimension. Then, this report devotes a chapter to the overarching findings common to multiple dimensions, and what those interconnected results tell us about the path to building social cohesion in the English-speaking Caribbean.

Chapter 1. Inclusive Communities

Section I. Intergroup Trust: The Foundation of Harmonious Communities

The English-speaking Caribbean is home to a diversity of population groups that include multiple cultures, religions, and ethnic groups. At the same time these groups are often subdivided by socioeconomic, class, linguistic or political differences[8]. While this diversity enriches the social dynamics of the region and its nations, it also represents a challenge for building harmonious relations among them including intergroup attitudes such as trust and tolerance which protect against processes of fragmentation and polarisation. What are the levels of these attitudes? Which groups are the key marginalised ones? And how can we improve these diversity-dynamics for increased connection and harmony between communities?

This diversity is not only a regional one, but also found at the country level, since each of the countries of the Caribbean to a vary degree are demographic and cultural mosaics. This is most evident in countries like Belize, whose population includes Mestizo, Creoles, and Indigenous Mayan communities, and Trinidad and Tobago, which includes people of Indo, Afro and Mixed descent. People of many different religions also coexist in the subregion, including people of different Christian denominations within the same country, as well as a significant number of Hindus and Muslims.

This scenario is even more intricate considering the role of migration to and from the subregion. The English-speaking Caribbean is a "place of origin, transit, and destination of extra-regional and intraregional migration flows, and experiences considerable return migration"[9], making the subregion a place where not only diversity exists, but also a region of constant change hence the well-known academic lens of continuity and change applied to the Caribbean. This complexity gives opportunities for intergroup tensions to develop, but also for multicultural dialogue and understanding to blossom.

Some groups are still subject to intense exclusion and rejection in the subregion. Such is the case of LGBTQ people, who despite the recent decriminalisation of same-sex sexual activity in some countries in the subregion, such as Belize, Barbados and Dominica, still face legal, social, and cultural barriers. Immigrants and asylum seekers are also marginalised, particularly Haitians in The Bahamas[10] and Venezuelans in Trinidad and Tobago[11], who struggle to integrate in the local communities. Those living with HIV also face great stigma and often experience a lack of acceptance. Facilitating the inclusion of marginalised groups is important to build harmonious intergroup relations in the subregion. This chapter includes data on social tolerance of several marginalised groups in the subregion, including

[8] Moncrieffe, J. (2004). Ethnic Diversity and State Response in the Caribbean. UNDP.
[9] IOM. (2017). Migration in the Caribbean: Current Trends, Opportunities and Challenges.
[10] Minority Rights Group. (n.d.). Haitians in The Bahamas.
[11] UNHCR. (2022). 2022 Trinidad and Tobago Interagency Participatory Assessment.

immigrants, LGBTQ people and those living with HIV, to highlight the necessity to facilitate their social inclusion within the Caribbean society.

Building trust and reducing tensions is needed not only to foster social cohesion, but also to improve the life of people in the Caribbean, and to accelerate the achievement of the SDGs, particularly SDG 10 which aims to reduce inequalities, but also SDG 16 on its aim to promote peaceful and inclusive societies. Targets 10.2 and 10.3, call for the need to reduce discrimination as well as to promote social inclusion to people from different age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion or economic or other status[12].

This chapter provides a snapshot a of the problematic levels of mistrust or intergroup tensions certain groups face, and then, identifies entry points to improve relations and build trust. By doing so, we provide evidence for policies and programmes which can work towards goals like SDG 10 and 16.

Levels of Intergroup Harmony

To measure Intergroup Harmony, we asked each individual their levels of Social Proximity[13], Positive Feelings[14], and Intergroup Trust[15] they feel towards six defined outgroups[16]. The six groups asked about were people i) from other areas of my country[17], ii) of other religions, iii) from a different socioeconomic background, iv) from a different ethnic or racial origin, v) with a different political opinion, and vi) from other countries of the English-Speaking Caribbean. Such a system of measurement allows us to understand if particular groups feel more tension or more harmony.

[12] UN. (n.d.) 10 Reduce inequality within and among countries.
[13] The average of the extent to which respondents would accept people from a different group as their relatives by marriage, or as their boss.
[14] The average of the degree to which respondents feel warm and friendly feelings (as opposed to cold and negative feelings) towards people from a different group.
[15] The average of the extent to which respondents trust people from a different group.
[16] Based on multiple consultations with local stakeholders as well as literature on the subregion.
[17] For The Bahamas, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago this was asked as "people from other islands of my country".



Figure 5. Diagram of Intergroup Harmony and its indicators.

The overall level of Intergroup Harmony is high, with a score of 7.9, this suggests that intergroup bonds in the subregion are relatively positive and strong. This is an important finding for the social health of Caribbean societies, and the relatively good relations between religious, ethnic, and political groups could indeed be a resilience factor which supports other aspects of social functioning. People tended to have the same levels of intergroup harmony regardless of their gender, age, or type of settlement.



Figure 6. Intergroup Harmony. Mean 0 to 10.

Social Proximity

Social Proximity is high overall, with a score of 9.0; with it being significantly higher in Belize (9.7). Although women in Dominica (8.5) and women in Saint Lucia (8.5) report lower values than the full sample, these are still high[18].



Figure 7. Social Proximity, Mean 0 to 10.

The Social Proximity indicator measures how open people would be to accept members of a different group as their boss or as a member of their family through marriage. In general, large majorities would be fully willing to accept people from different groups as their bosses or into their families. In both cases only less than 10% would not accept someone from a different group as their boss or into their family.

[18] No significant difference was identified across gender, age, or type of settlement.



Figure 8. Social Proximity. Share of people in the subregion who would be open to accept someone from a different group to marry into their family.



Figure 9. Social Proximity. Share of people in the subregion who would be open to accept someone from a different group to be their boss.

Social Proximity is high overall, showing good social proximity to all groups. Social Proximity is more or less very similar across all countries, although it is slightly higher in Belize and slightly lower in Saint Lucia, Dominica, Jamaica, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, but still high.

People feel the same level of Social Proximity for all groups, regardless of ethnic, religious, or other identities, which shows a healthy lack of prejudice.

The only slight outlier value is that the Bahamians have lower Social Proximity towards other countries in the region (8.3), compared to all other groups, implying they tend to feel distant

and uncomfortable with other countries. This may be attributed to the historical relationship between the Bahamas and Haiti[19].

	Full sample	Bahamas	Belize	Dominica	Jamaica	St. Lucia	SVG	T&T
All Groups	9.0	9.2	9.7	8.7	8.9	8.8	8.9	9.0
Other Areas of My Country	9.1	9.6	9.7	8.8	9.0	8.9	8.9	9.0
Other Religions	8.9	9.4	9.7	8.5	8.8	8.7	8.8	8.8
Different Socioeconomic Backgrounds	9.0	9.3	9.8	8.6	8.8	8.8	8.8	9.2
Other Ethnicities	9.0	9.1	9.7	8.6	8.8	8.8	9.0	9.0
Different Political Orientations	9.0	9.4	9.8	8.5	8.7	9.0	8.8	9.1
Other Countries in the Region	8.9	8.3	9.6	8.9	9.0	8.9	9.0	9.0

Table 4. Social Proximity per group. Mean 0 to 10.

Positive Feelings

This indicator measures feelings towards people from a different group, on a 0 to 10 scale in which 0 indicates cold and hostile feelings, 5 indifferent, and 10 indicates warm and friendly feelings. While scoring slightly lower than Social Proximity, Positive Feelings across the subregion remain high (8.5), indicating that people tend to have warm and friendly feelings towards people from different groups.



Figure 10. Positive Feelings, Mean 0 to 10.

Overall, people in the subregion tend to have lower Positive Feelings towards people with different political opinions (8.2), in comparison to the other groups. This might indicate that there if intergroup harmony were to be a priority area, the cleavages to focus on are political rather than social, ethnic or religious, but this might imply that the social, ethnic or religious

[19] Perry, C. M. (2014). Invasion from the South: Social Construction of the Haitian 'Other' in The Bahamas. International Journal of Bahamian Studies, 20(1), 1–12.

might be an opportunity that might provide the most useful bridges and entry points for socio-political divisions.

	Full sample	Bahamas	Belize	Dominica	Jamaica	St. Lucia	SVG	T&T
All Groups	8.5	8.9	8.4	8.8	8.3	8.7	8.7	8.6
Other Areas of My Country	8.6	9.3	8.4	9.0	8.4	8.8	8.7	8.7
Other Religions	8.6	9.1	8.5	8.9	8.4	8.8	8.7	8.8
Different Socioeconomic Backgrounds	8.5	9.0	8.4	8.8	8.3	8.7	8.7	8.6
Other Ethnicities	8.5	8.7	8.4	8.8	8.3	8.6	8.8	8.7
Different Political Orientations	8.2	8.8	8.4	8.4	8.1	8.4	8.5	8.3
Other Countries in the Region	8.4	8.4	8.3	8.9	8.4	8.8	8.7	8.4

Table 5. Positive Feelings per group. Mean 0 to 10.

Intergroup Trust

Among the three indicators comprising intergroup harmony, Intergroup Trust scores the lowest (6.3). This implies that the nature of the intergroup tensions in the Caribbean are not due to a festering negativity, hostility or rejection of other groups, but rather that there simply is a lower level of trust to outgroups and across social divisions. This is an important nuance to note as it suggests development work that provides opportunities for groups to share and learn about each other at the community level can increase levels of intergroup trust and social cohesion more generally. While the previous sections have shown that Positive Feelings and Social Proximity towards outgroups are very high, lower levels of trust are in line with SCORE findings in heavily conflict-affected countries, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina[20] and Ethiopia[21], where Intergroup Trust is lower than other Intergroup Harmony indicators. Trust towards all groups is significantly higher in Trinidad and Tobago (7.2), but lower in Jamaica (5.8) and in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (5.8)[22]. This might be a reflection of the higher levels of demographic diversity found in Trinidad and Tobago in contrast to the other two examples.

[20] SeeD. SCORE Bosnia-Herzegovina: Measuring peace in a multi-ethnic society.
[21] SeeD. The Ethiopian Peace Index.
[22] No significant difference was identified across gender, age, or type of settlement



Figure 11. Intergroup Trust, Mean 0 to 10.

People with different political orientations tend to be slightly less trusted than other groups; 28% mistrust them, compared to around 15% to 20% for all other groups. This may be a reflection of two-party Westminster political systems across the region which can create a sense of polarisation and clientelism in how governments share resources with the nation unevenly[23].



Figure 12. Intergroup Trust. Share of the extent to which people would trust someone from a different group.

[23] Veenendaal, W., & Corbett, J. (2019). Clientelism in small states: how smallness influences patron–client networks in the Caribbean and the Pacific. Democratization, 27(1), 61–80; and, Norman, G. (2015). "Assessing Westminster in the Caribbean: Then and now." Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 53, no. 1: 95-107.

Overall, people in Jamaica tend to trust people from other political orientations less (5.3), which has been documented in the academic literature previously[24]. In The Bahamas and Belize people report lower levels of trust to people from other countries in the region (6.1 and 6.0 respectively), which may be a reflection of the high levels of trans-migration the two countries face in the context of people trying to get to the United States. In Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, trust towards people from other islands of the country, in this case The Grenadines, is lower (5.6).

	Full Sample	Bahamas	Belize	Dominica	Jamaica	St. Lucia	SVG	T&T
All Groups	6.3	6.8	6.3	6.1	5.8	6.1	5.8	7.2
Other Areas of My Country	6.3	7.4	6.2	6.2	5.8	6.1	5.6	7.1
Other Religions	6.5	7.1	6.4	6.2	6.0	6.2	5.9	7.4
Different Socioeconomic Backgrounds	6.5	7.1	6.4	6.1	6.0	6.1	5.9	7.4
Other Ethnicities	6.3	6.7	6.5	6.2	5.8	6.2	5.8	7.3
Different Political Orientations	5.9	6.7	6.2	5.8	5.3	5.9	5.7	6.8
Other Countries in the Region	6.2	6.1	6.0	6.0	5.9	6.2	5.8	7.1

Table 6. Intergroup Trust. Mean 0 to 10.

In countries with several islands, we also tested if there were intergroup tensions between residents of the different islands. In The Bahamas, half of the people from Grand Bahama mistrust people from other islands, compared to only 4% of people in New Providence who mistrust people from other islands. These levels of mistrust could be the result of the economic disparity between both islands and the perceived centralisation of government resources and job opportunities in New Providence, which might lead to some degree of resentment from people outside New Providence.

Almost one in three people in Saint Vincent mistrust people from The Grenadines[25]. In Trinidad and Tobago, levels of trust between people of the two islands are high. In both the islands of Trinidad and Tobago only 5% of respondents mistrust people from the other island.

[24] Harriott, A., Lewis, B. A., Hinton, N. L., & Zechmeister, E. J. (2018). The political culture of democracy in Jamaica and in the Americas, 2016/17: A comparative study of democracy and governance. USAID/Jamaica.

[25] Due to accessibility limitations, no data on the Grenadines was collected.

		Mistrust towards people from a different island of my country
Bahamas	New Providence	4%
	Grand Bahama	48%
SVG	St. Vincent	28%
T&T	Trinidad	5%
	Tobago	5%

Table 7. Percentage of citizens that mistrust people from other islands of their country, per island. Data only from the two islands sampled in The Bahamas, St. Vincent, and Trinidad and Tobago. The other islands of the Bahamas, and the Grenadines were not sampled in this round of the SCORE due to resource limitations and accessibility challenges.

Social Tolerance

The Social Tolerance Indicator measures how tolerant are people towards members of marginalised groups, by asking if they would accept to interact with them personally, or would accept them but avoid communication, or if they would prefer if they left their community. The groups included in this indicator were selected following input from local experts and civil society members on what were the key marginalised groups in their communities. The groups include people who face economic, social, structural or identity-based marginalisation such as people with different types of disabilities, people living with HIV, immigrants[26], Rastafarians, LGBTQ+ people, among others.

% "I would accept to interact with them personally"	Full sample	Bahamas	Belize	Dominica	Jamaica	St. Lucia	SVG	T&T
People With Darker Colour of Skin	91%	95%	91%	89%	89%	90%	88%	95%
People With Physical Disabilities	90%	96%	87%	93%	87%	93%	94%	94%
Rastafarians	86%	72%	81%	88%	87%	91%	89%	88%
Migrants	66%	39%	84%	78%	66%	80%	73%	68%
Young Unoccupied People	65%	66%	55%	64%	62%	72%	77%	70%
Immigrants	64%	33%	80%	76%	64%	78%	73%	66%
People Living With HIV	61%	69%	74%	59%	65%	63%	71%	49%
People With Mental Disabilities	58%	58%	72%	54%	54%	63%	68%	61%
LGBTQ+ People	32%	26%	66%	39%	30%	51%	30%	28%
Sex Workers	30%	17%	60%	30%	35%	39%	29%	14%
Drug Users	23%	19%	42%	34%	22%	43%	30%	16%

Table 8. Social Tolerance. Share of people who answered, "I would accept to interact with them personally" when asked about each of the groups in the left-hand column, in each country surveyed.

[26] Based on consultations with local experts, we used the term "Immigrants" to refer to people who have migrated under irregular conditions, and "Migrants" to refer to foreign workers.



Figure 13. Social Tolerance. Share of people who answered, "I would accept to interact with them personally", "I would accept them in the community, but personally avoid communication", and "I would prefer if they leave our community" when asked about each of the groups in the left-hand column, in each country surveyed.

Overall, respondents are more likely to accept people with a darker colour of skin, people with physical disabilities, and Rastafarians. On the contrary, LGBTQ people, Sex workers, and Drug users are less likely to be accepted; only one in three people in the subregion would be willing to interact personally with LGBTQ people, with 38% of the full sample preferring they leave their community. A third of the sample would avoid communication with unoccupied youths or prefer they leave the community completely, which suggests a breakdown at the community level with local youths, who more than likely need community support and mentorship due to their perceived idleness. Despite these general tendencies, some countries show different trends, suggesting that Social Tolerance is an indicator that varies per context. In The Bahamas, Migrants and Immigrants are less accepted in comparison to the rest of the countries. In Belize, Young Unoccupied people are less accepted, but the share of people accepting LGBTQ people, Sex Workers, and Drugs Users is twice as big compared to the full sample. In Trinidad and Tobago, respondents reported lower acceptance for People Living with HIV, Sex Workers, and Drug Users than in other countries.

When it comes to people living with disabilities, there is significant difference between the levels of tolerance towards people with physical disabilities and people with mental disabilities, with 90% of the people willing to accept to interact with the former but only 58% willing to accept to interact with the latter. This suggests that there is still and stigma

towards people with mental disabilities, which has been previously identified in the academic literature[27].

Although Immigrants (people who have migrated under irregular conditions) are less accepted than Migrants (foreign workers) in all the countries, the difference is not significant, indicating that the attitudes towards different types of foreign people is very similar. 66% of the respondents would accept to interact with migrants, and 64% with immigrants.

There is still a stigma towards people living with HIV, with only 6 in 10 of the respondents willing to interact with them. Belize reported higher levels of acceptance, with 74% willing to interact with them, contrasted with only 49% in Trinidad and Tobago.

The levels of tolerance are higher in Belize and Saint Lucia, but lower in The Bahamas. People in rural settlements report slightly lower levels of tolerance (6.8), compared to those in urban settlements (7.6). No significant difference was identified across gender or age.



Figure 14. Social Tolerance. Mean 0 to 10.

The SCORE asked respondents if they felt that progress was being made towards the inclusion of marginalised groups, where 0 corresponded to a total worsening of the situation, 10 to strong improvements, and 5 if they thought the situation was staying the same. The score for the full sample of 4.3 indicates that across the region, the consensus is that the inclusion of marginalised groups is slightly worsening, and thus it is still an issue

[27] Arthur, C. M., Hickling, F. W., Robertson-Hickling, H., Haynes-Robinson, T., Abel, W., & Whitley, R. (2010). "Mad, sick, head nuh good": Mental illness stigma in Jamaican communities. *Transcultural psychiatry*, *47*(2), 252-275.

to urgently work on. This indicator is the lowest in The Bahamas (3.2) and in Saint Lucia (3.5).



Figure 15. Progress in Inclusion of Marginalised groups. Mean 0 to 10.

Building Intergroup Trust: Identifying entry points with a predictive model

Given its lower scores compared to Social Proximity and Positive Feelings SCORE data indicates that intergroup trust is the weakest aspect of intergroup relations in the Caribbean. The importance of social trust among members of a community is also strongly highlighted in the literature. Hence, a predictive model was developed to identify positive and negative predictors of Intergroup Trust, which is shown in Figure 16.



Figure 16. Predictive linear regression model on Intergroup Trust. Positive predictors, which increase intergroup trust, visualised in blue, while negative predictors, which lead to a decrease in trust, visualised in red. Numbers represent the standardised beta coefficients, which quantify the strength of the link between driver and outcome. Adjusted R^2 = 0.254. Controlled for country, gender, and education level.

Overall, the results show a large number of statistically significant predictors of trust, which can be classified into rather diverse categories (economic, social, individual, attitudinal, and so on). However, none of the predictors are particularly strong[28]. This suggests that Intergroup Trust doesn't have a single dominant entry point, but instead it depends on several factors, which include a combination of individual, social, economic and other kinds of factors. This demonstrates the power of SCORE to provide granular insights around overdetermined phenomena.

This result may be because trust, or lack thereof, is context specific. The entry points for building trust may vary wildly between countries, communities, social groups, and even individuals. Mistrust may have been generated by a variety of very localised or individual factors rather than by broadly common social dynamics. Although the strongest predictors (Intergroup Contact and Access to Community Spaces[29]) are certainly universally relevant, the weakness of all other drivers suggests that they may be very important in some areas and less important in others. Thus, strategies seeking to build trust should first identify potential flash points for mistrust or avenues for building trust, by reviewing if the drivers shown in Figure 16 indeed apply to the particular groups and communities in question. The drivers in Figure 16 are thus a useful tool to begin a mapping of plausible factors associated with building trust, with further research in each context, to determine which kinds of drivers are more relevant to be targeted as entry points.

Broadly, the indicators that build Intergroup Trust can be arranged into six categories[30]:

- Intergroup contact.

[28] at most β=0.1
[29] Both with a coefficient of 0.10 in the Intergroup Trust Model.
[30] Age is also a predictor, indicating that older people are more likely to trust outgroups.

- Social bonds: Community Cooperation, Family Cohesion, and Access to Community Spaces.
- Attitudes towards marginalised groups: Social Tolerance and Positive Attitudes towards LGBTQ people.
- Individual mental wellbeing: WHO Wellbeing
- Personal Security and Negative Community Dynamics
- Socioeconomic factors: Social Mobility, Subjective Poverty, Marginalisation, and Food Security.

In the following subsections, each category of indicators will be discussed in more detail and disaggregated across areas and demographic groups.

Intergroup Contact

Intergroup Contact is positively related to Intergroup Trust[31], indicating that increasing it would increase Intergroup Trust. Intergroup Contact is generally high with an average score of 6.6 in the subregion; where 0 means no actual contact and communication and 10 indicates daily contact and communication. The value of 6 indicates contact and communication 2 – 3 times a month. Intergroup Contact is slightly higher in the Eastern Caribbean countries (7.3), but lower in Trinidad and Tobago (5.9). Intergroup Contact is significantly higher in urban areas (7.2), compared to rural areas (6.1), and in people with higher levels of education (7.7), compared to people with lower levels of education (6.0)[32]. No significant difference was identified across gender or age.



Figure 17. Intergroup Contact. Mean 0 to 10.

While the frequency of contact with people from different groups is high, half of the respondents reported never or rarely having contact with people from other countries in the region, this goes as high as 63% in Trinidad and Tobago. Almost one third of the full sample

[31] Coefficient in the Intergroup Trust Model: 0.10
[32] People with university degrees, compared to people with incomplete secondary.

reported never or rarely having contact with people from other areas of their country. 57% of respondents in Trinidad and Tobago reported never or rarely having contact with people from other islands of their country, meaning people from Trinidad having low contact with people from Tobago, and vice versa.

	Full Sample	Bahamas	Belize	Dominica	Jamaica	St. Lucia	SVG	T&T
Other Areas of My Country	31%	28%	21%	16%	21%	19%	19%	57%
Other Religions	23%	10%	14%	15%	28%	12%	18%	22%
Different Socioeconomic Background	18%	14%	15%	15%	17%	15%	21%	22%
Other Ethnicities	23%	27%	16%	20%	24%	23%	30%	21%
Different Political Orientations	18%	13%	14%	11%	14%	13%	18%	29%
Other Countries in the Region	52%	57%	49%	24%	49%	34%	40%	63%

Table 9. Intergroup Contact. Share of people who answer "Never" or "Rarely" to the frequency of contact with members of a different group.

Social Bonds Indicators

Indicators related to social bonds are positively related to Intergroup Trust, with Community Cooperation, Family Cohesion and Access to Community Spaces being predictors of it[33]; improving them would potentially improve Intergroup Trust. The Community Cooperation Indicator measures how frequently individuals or their households engage in activities about supporting people in their communities, including helping their neighbours with daily tasks such as looking after their children, supporting efforts to improve their neighbourhood, liming with their neighbours, supporting people in need, among others. Community Cooperation has a subregional score of 4.6, being lower in The Bahamas (3.4) and Trinidad and Tobago (3.9). No significant difference was identified across gender, age, or type of settlement. (To learn more about Community Cooperation and what its drivers are, see the chapter on positive citizenship).

[33] Coefficients in the Intergroup Model: Community Cooperation – 0.08, Family Cohesion – 0.06, and Access to Community Spaces – 0.10.



Figure 18. Community Cooperation. Mean 0 to 10.

Family Cohesion is also a predictor of Intergroup Trust, and measures family harmony and cooperation. Almost 6 in 10 fully agree that their family support each other, enjoy being with their family, and think that there are strong bonds in their family. However, 1 in 10 disagree to different extents that their families support each other and that there are strong bonds in their family.



Figure 19. Family Cohesion. Share of the level of how much people agree or disagree.

Family Cohesion is high across the region (8.2), being significantly higher in Belize (9.2). However, as a key resilience factor, that Family Cohesion could be higher still suggests for a minority there is a breakdown and they may need supporting in this area[34]; this might be the case of some groups where this indicator is lower such as people who have been marginalised due to their income (6.8), people with disabilities (7.5), and people who cannot afford food or clothes (7.6). No significant difference was identified across gender, age, or type of settlement.

[34] Baek, H., Han, S., & Seepersad, R. (2023). Low self-control and delinquent behavior among Caribbean youths: The moderating role of parental supervision. International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology.



Figure 20. Family Cohesion. Mean 0 to 10.

Access to Community Spaces[35], also a predictor of Intergroup Trust, has a score of 5.0 in the subregion, with it being significantly higher in Belize (7.2). Urban settlements report significantly higher access to community spaces (5.7), compared to rural settlements (4.3). Also, people living in poverty have less access (4.1), than those who can afford expensive goods (5.5). No significant difference was identified across gender or age.



Figure 21. Access to Community Spaces. Mean 0 to 10.

[35] The Access to Community Spaces indicator measures the frequency to which respondents have access to these ones in their local community.

One fifth of the full sample has never had access to community spaces, and this number goes up to 35% in Jamaica. In Saint Vincent and the Grenadines only 18% of the sample reports have constant access (always and often) to community spaces. Belize is the only country where a majority responded that they often or always have access to community spaces. This variation across countries in such an important driver should inform the contextualisation of policies seeking to build trust. In Belize, this driver, although strong, scores quite high and so maybe shouldn't be prioritised, whereas in Jamaica, there is a lot of easy progress that could be made, given the baseline is so low.



Figure 22. Access to Community Spaces. Share of the frequency to which people have access to community spaces.

Attitudes towards marginalised groups: Social Tolerance & Positive Attitudes towards LGBTQ people

Social Tolerance is a predictor of Intergroup Trust[36], indicating that accepting marginalised groups would have a positive impact on trust in the subregion.

Another indicator that predicts Intergroup Trust related to acceptance of minorities is Positive Attitudes towards LGBTQ People. Although still low, women score higher (3.5) than men (2.7). No significant difference was identified across age, or type of settlement.

[36] Coefficient in the Intergroup Model Trust: 0.09



Figure 23. Positive Attitudes towards LGBTQ People. Mean 0 to 10.

Individual Wellbeing and Mental Health

People's wellbeing is a positive predictor of Intergroup Trust, indicating that taking care of mental health needs would have a marginal impact in intergroup relations. To measure wellbeing, we use the World Health Organisation's WHO-5 Well-Being Index, which has been recognised as a valid scale to measure mental wellbeing[37]. There also is strong regional variation in mental health across the seven countries surveyed. People in Dominica and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines are more likely to have lower levels of mental wellbeing (scores below 6) while Belize scores much higher (8.2). People in rural settlements report lower levels of wellbeing (6.5), compared to urban settlements (7.1). No significant differences were identified across gender or age groups.

[37] CORC. The World Health Organisation- Five Well-Being Index (WHO-5).



Figure 24. WHO Wellbeing. Mean 0 to 10.

Table 10 below shows people's responses to the particular questions used in the WHO Wellbeing indicator, which correspond to various aspects of wellbeing in their lives. Specifically, it shows the percentage of people who said that in the last two weeks they have felt these wellbeing aspects less than half of the time. Worryingly, one in five people across the region consistently report lack of several wellbeing aspects for most of their daily life. In Dominica and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, that number is much higher, with around four in ten people reporting low wellbeing.

% At no time + Some of the time + Less than half of the time	Full Sample	Bahamas	Belize	Dominica	Jamaica	St. Lucia	SVG	T&T
My daily life has been filled with things that interested me	26%	18%	10%	44%	31%	33%	45%	17%
I woke up feeling fresh and rested	25%	17%	12%	43%	32%	30%	48%	14%
I have felt active and vigorous	25%	18%	11%	43%	32%	29%	43%	15%
I have felt calm and relaxed	21%	11%	10%	37%	27%	26%	42%	11%
I have felt cheerful and in good spirits	20%	13%	13%	36%	25%	26%	42%	10%

Table 10. Wellbeing. Share of people who answered, "At no time", "Some of the time", or "Less than half of the time" over the last two weeks.

Wellbeing is the lowest in those who have been marginalised due to income (5.1), and it is also low in people living in poverty (6.0), young NEETs (6.2), and people with disabilities (6.2). The SCORE can tell us what groups most need support in this area.



Figure 25. Wellbeing. Score of different demographic groups. Mean 0 to 10.

Personal Security & Negative Community Dynamics

Citizen security indicators are predictors of Intergroup Trust (itself a key aspect of positive peace) and particularly Personal Security[38]. Increasing Personal Security will increase Intergroup Trust which again connects to positive community dynamics such as Social Mobility. Most of the countries show similar levels of Personal Security, with it being high in Dominica (5.7), and the highest in Belize (6.6).



Figure 26. Personal Security. Mean 0 to 10.

The Negative Community Dynamics indicator is a negative predictor of Intergroup Trust[39]. This indicator measures the perceived frequency in the community of fights, the sale of drugs, access to weapons, and the presence of gangs. This is significantly higher in the

[38] Coefficient in the Intergroup Trust Model: 0.09
[39] Coefficient in the Intergroup Trust Model: -0.06

Eastern Caribbean countries[40]. This is also higher in urban settlements (3.7), and people who have been marginalised due to their income (4.3). No significant difference was identified across age or gender.



Figure 27. Negative Community Dynamics. Mean 0 to 10.

Socioeconomic factors

The predictive model shows that socioeconomic indicators are also related to Intergroup Trust. Social Mobility[41] and Food Security[42] are positive drivers, and Subjective Poverty and Marginalisation are negative drivers[43] (meaning that a higher prevalence of poverty and marginalisation potentially leads to lower levels of trust). Overall, The Bahamas scores higher across the four indicators, while Dominica scores the lowest. In general, Jamaica and the Eastern Caribbean countries show a more fragile picture when it comes to socioeconomic dynamics. No significant difference was identified across gender, or type of settlement.

	Full sample	Bahamas	Belize	Dominica	Jamaica	St. Lucia	SVG	T&T
Social Mobility	6.2	6.8	6.4	5.0	6.2	5.5	5.4	6.3
Food Security	8.8	9.2	9.7	8.3	8.7	9.0	8.3	8.8
Subjective Poverty	4.7	2.8	5.3	5.3	5.2	4.8	5.3	3.9
Marginalisation	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1

Table 11. Scores for Social Mobility, Food Security, Subjective Poverty, and Marginalisation. Mean 0 to 10.

[40] Average of 4.3 in the Eastern Caribbean, compared to an average of 3.2 in other countries in the sample.
[41] Coefficient in the Intergroup Trust Model: 0.08
[42] Coefficient in the Intergroup Trust Model: 0.5
[43] Coefficient in the Intergroup Trust Model: -0.5 in both cases

Recommendations

Overall, intergroup relations in the subregion are harmonious, and Intergroup Harmony scores high, particularly Social Proximity and Positive Feelings. This should be considered a strength of the people of the region, and a potential factor contributing to resilience of communities. The SCORE implies that the people of the Caribbean have cohesion across ethnic, religious, and socio-economic lines. These feelings of proximity and warmth imply a mostly positive outlook towards other groups, and can be used to foster dialogue and understanding towards groups that score lower, such as people with different political orientations and from other countries in the English-speaking Caribbean.

Levels of Intergroup Trust are lower than feelings of proximity and warmth towards other groups. This indicates that increasing the levels of trust is key to improve intergroup relations in the subregion.

People in the Caribbean have lower levels of Intergroup Trust towards political outgroups, and towards people from other countries in the region. Strategies to foster trust should explicitly address the inclusion of immigrants and foreigners, as well as integrate politicians from across the political spectrum in communication and engagement strategies to promote more human and respectful politics, rather than framing political opposition as fundamentally untrustworthy.

Intergroup Trust between different islands in The Bahamas and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines is low. There should be a focus on understanding the reasons for mistrust in Grand Bahama and Saint Vincent, and design interventions which can be implemented without leaving more remote areas behind.

SCORE predictive modelling on building Intergroup Trust implies the need for a whole-of-society interdisciplinary approach, given the wide array of predictors discovered to be associated with trust.

The predictive model shows that building trust requires increasing opportunities for contact, and facilitating access to community spaces, fostering the inclusion of marginalised groups, especially LGBTQ people, taking care of the mental wellbeing of individuals, responding to issues of citizen security, and tackling the existing socioeconomic inequalities. This could be an opportunity to convene a wide group of stakeholders, including UN agencies, civil society, governmental bodies and local leaderships, whose responsibilities and areas of interest include these entry-points.

Such a group should first recognise the multi-systemic nature of the issue at hand, and then design collaborative strategies to improve trust and social cohesion based on the entry-points discovered. Frequency of contact with people from social out-groups is the strongest predictor of Intergroup Trust. This implies that focussing on contact and access to community spaces should be prioritised, at a minimum. While the levels of Intergroup Contact with people from different groups of the same country are good, half of the respondents reported never or rarely having contact with people from other areas of their country. Since one in five in the subregion has never had access to community spaces,

governments should focus on creating and supporting them, as well as facilitating the easy access to them, particularly from people in marginalised communities.

Based on the list of predictors of trust that the SCORE has identified, effort should be made to perform qualitative mappings and interviews with stakeholders to understand if these drivers are relevant to the specific community and social groups at hand and select those which are validated by the community as entry points.

It is important to improve Community Cooperation[44] and Family Cohesion in marginalised groups. People living in poverty, people with disabilities, people with lower levels of education, and marginalised people report lower values. Programmes that focus on promoting harmony within families should target these groups. Families where relations are severely shattered can be intervened upon through multi-family healing interventions, where multiple generations of families are brought together to participate in group-therapy sessions. Such interventions have been shown to increase mental wellbeing and social relationships, and lead to greater collaboration within wider family units, and across families within the same community, even leading to more economic opportunities and livelihoods improvements among participants.

It is urgent to improve the inclusion of marginalised groups. On one hand it is a predictor of Intergroup Trust, but also there is a regional consensus that the situation is getting worse. LGBTQ people, people with mental disabilities, and people living with HIV are among the groups which are the most rejected, across the region. Only one in three people in the subregion would be willing to interact personally with LGBTQ people[45]. Also, rural areas report lower levels of Social Tolerance, indicating that efforts to increase tolerance should be extended beyond urban centres. Although fostering Social Tolerance should be a regional strategy, the data shows that each context is different – however that around 30% of national populations suggest they do not want to engage with young unoccupied people is somewhat of a regional crisis of exclusion. There needs to be focus on tailored programmes that respond to the groups that are excluded in each country in a context-sensitive way. For example, in The Bahamas social tolerance programmes should seek to improve acceptance of immigrants, whereas in Belize they should focus on the inclusion of young NEETs. These issues could be included in school curricula across all educative levels.

Individuals' mental wellbeing is important for Intergroup Trust. It is also a negative factor in an individual's level of violent attitudes. Wellbeing is significantly lower in people marginalised due to income, people living in poverty, young NEETs, people with disabilities, people in rural areas, the unemployed, and people with low levels of education. To improve mental wellbeing among these groups, consider granting prioritised or subsidised access to mental health services to these groups when they request it. To understand the extent of various specific mental health issues in the population, conduct regular mental health surveys with more clinical indicators tailored to detect specific mental issues such as depression, anxiety, suicidality, and PTSD, so that strategies can be tailored accordingly.

[44] See model on Community Cooperation.
[45] See chapter on Gender Equality and Diversity.

Low levels of community security potentially undermine Intergroup Trust. Strategies should focus on improving citizen security and positive community dynamics and reducing the presence of drugs, gangs, and easy access to weapons, especially in the Eastern Caribbean. This could be done by supporting existing regional programmes focused on security such as CariSECURE 2.0, while also working on social mobility and opportunities for entrepreneurism.

Low social mobility, access to food, marginalisation and prevalence of poverty marginally decrease Intergroup Trust. Improving people's socioeconomic conditions could be achieved by implementing and supporting initiatives focus on creating job opportunities, especially in Dominica and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.

Section II. Enhancing Social Mobility to Reduce Inequalities

Inclusive communities have been defined as those where different groups coexist harmoniously, while also providing equal opportunities for upward social mobility[46]. By prioritising equality, social cohesion, and access to equal opportunities, communities can enhance harmony between different groups, as well as fostering more dynamic and equitable societies.

Social mobility is defined as the ability of individuals or groups to move within a social hierarchy with changes in income, education, occupation, and social status[47]. This mobility can occur within one's lifetime, or be intergenerational, occurring across generations[48]. The study of social mobility is essential for understanding the dynamics of inequality and opportunity within a society. By identifying the barriers to social mobility, transformative policies can be designed that lead to equity and economic justice.

Although intergenerational mobility has been improving in the Caribbean, with increases in the share of individuals with higher levels of education and income than their parents, relative social mobility is still of great importance in the region[49]. Alongside Latin America, the Caribbean is said to be characterised by high inequality and low growth, two interrelated factors[50]. Social mobility directly influences a young person's ability to break the cycle of poverty and contribute meaningfully to their communities[51], with social mobility among

[46] Jennings, Z. (2020). Social Inclusion in Education in the Commonwealth Caribbean. In: Papa, R. (eds) Handbook on Promoting Social Justice in Education. Springer, Cham; and, CEPAL (2023). Social Panorama of Latin America and the Caribbean.
[47] Schaefer, R. T. (2012). Sociology: A brief introduction (9th ed.). McGraw-Hill.
[48] Schaefer, R. T. (2012). Sociology: A brief introduction (9th ed.). McGraw-Hill.
[49] World Bank Group. (2017). Poverty and Inequality Monitoring: Latin America and the Caribbean. Intergenerational mobility.
[50] UNDP. (2021). Regional Human Development Report 2021. Trapped: High Inequality and Low Growth in Latin America and the Caribbean.
[51] United Nations in the Caribbean. (2021). Latin American and Caribbean youth and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development: an examination from within the UN system.

young people considered vital not just for their personal advancement, but also for the overall prosperity and resilience of Caribbean countries[52].

Extensive research underscores the importance of social mobility in fostering social cohesion and trust in institutions. Increased social mobility can also lead to greater social cohesion by reducing inequality and offering fair opportunities for advancement countries with higher levels of social mobility tend to experience higher levels of social trust and cohesion[53]. Furthermore, evidence from the global north shows that reducing inequality and improving social mobility can lead to better health outcomes and lower crime rates[54].

This chapter presents a comprehensive model focused on social mobility, exploring its key drivers such as intergroup harmony, economic factors, trust in institutions, and employment. The findings indicate that social mobility is experienced differently by young people, highlighting the need for targeted policies and interventions to enhance mobility and reduce inequality. By understanding and addressing the drivers of social mobility, we can work towards creating more equitable and cohesive societies.

Identifying the Drivers of Social Mobility

To understand the levels of Social Mobility, respondents were asked about their perceptions of key aspects of their economic future and prospects. This provides an accurate assessment of the subjective experiences of barriers and opportunities that people may feel. By using metrics at the individual level, we can identify entry points that are much more granular and sensitive to individual realities. As such, Social Mobility was measured by asking respondents whether they perceive their economic situation to be better than the previous generation's, whether they believe their children's economic situation will be better than their own, and whether they feel that they can improve their own economic situation with their current opportunities.

Social Mobility is lower in Dominica than in other countries[55], where 34% of respondents believe their socioeconomic condition is not better than their parents, and 22% believe that they cannot improve their socioeconomic situation with the opportunities currently available to them (Figure 29). Some of the socio-economic reasons for persistent poverty in Dominica have been studied previously[56]. These figures compare to 16% and 10% within the full sample, respectively. Social Mobility is also lower in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines[57] and in Saint Lucia[58] compared to the rest of the sample.

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[52] Burunciuc, L. (2021). An investment in education can fuel the Caribbean's growth. World Bank Group.
[53] Blanden, J., Gregg, P., & Machin, S. (2005). Intergenerational mobility in Europe and North America. Centre for Economic Performance.
[54] Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community. New York: Simon & Schuster.
[55] ANOVA, $p < 0.01$, $F = 11$, Cohen's d effect size 0.53
[56] 5 Reasons for Poverty in Dominica. https://borgenproject.org/poverty-in-dominica/
[57] ANOVA, $p < 0.01$, $F = 8$, Cohen's d effect size 0.36
[58] ANOVA, $p < 0.01$, $F = 11$, Cohen's d effect size 0.32

Social Mobility is reportedly slightly higher in The Bahamas[59], although according to the 2021 Wealth Gini coefficients[60], the Bahamas is the most unequal of the countries surveyed[61]. This may be attributed, in part, to the urban nature of the SCORE sample in The Bahamas.

In both Dominica[62] and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines[63], Social Mobility is lower among urban respondents. In Trinidad and Tobago[64], Social Mobility is higher among people living in the capital. Overall, Social Mobility is higher in respondents who have completed university education[65], for those who are currently employed[66], and for people with higher levels of income[67].

There are no significant differences in Social Mobility between respondents aged 18 to 35, and those aged 36 and above. A slightly higher proportion of respondents aged 36 and above believe that their economic and social condition is better than their parents' (30%), compared to those aged 18 to 35 (23%). Younger respondents display significantly higher levels of Migration Tendency[68] and lower levels of Voting History[69], demonstrating why it is important to improve their socioeconomic conditions and opportunities in the region.

[59] ANOVA, $p < 0.01$, $F = 14$, Cohen's d effect size 0.26
[60] Global Wealth Databook 2022. Credit Suisse Research Institute.
[61] 2021 Wealth Gini coefficients in descending order, where the highest is the most unequal: The Bahamas 0.895, Belize 0.835, Jamaica 0.822, Dominica 0.813, Saint Lucia 0.813, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 0.813, Trinidad and Tobago 0.757.
[62] ANOVA, $p < 0.01$, $F = 16$, Cohen's d = 0.42. Mean score Dominica urban = 4.1 out of 10, Dominica rural 5.3 out of 10.
[63] ANOVA, $p < 0.01$, $F = 16$, Cohen's d = 0.57. Mean score SVG urban = 4.1, SVG rural = 5.6.
[64] ANOVA, $p < 0.01$, $F = 11$, Cohen's d effect size = 0.53. Mean score T&T capital = 7.4, other = 6.3
[65] ANOA, $p < 0.01$, $F = 28$, Cohen's d effect size compared to those with incomplete secondary education 0.48.
[66] ANOVA, $p < 0.01$, $F = 84$, Cohen's d effect size 0.33.
[67] ANOVA, $p < 0.01$, $F = 133$, Cohen's d effect size of those who can afford expensive goods compared to other groups 0.76-0.42.
[68] ANOVA, $p < 0.01$, $F = 405$, Cohen's d effect size 0.73
[69] ANOVA, $p < 0.01$, $F = 139.58$, Cohen's d effect size 0.48



Figure 28: Heatmap of mean scores for Social Mobility on a scale from 0 to 10.

To what extent do you agree...



Figure 29: Frequency of responses for Social Mobility, by country, all ages.

Entry Points for the Socioeconomically Underprivileged

A linear regression was used to identify the drivers of Social Mobility in respondents aged 18 to 35. The analysis focuses on younger generations because social mobility directly influences young people's ability to break the cycle of poverty and contribute meaningfully to their communities[70], with social mobility among young people considered vital not just for their personal advancement, but also for the overall prosperity and resilience of Caribbean countries[71]. Further, the model was weighted such that it retained regional and demographic proportionally, but excluded wealthy people, down-weighted middle-class people, and up-weighted the poorest respondents. As a result, the model is most sensitive to the dynamics that are present among poorer respondents and will detect entry points which are most relevant to poorer citizens. The motivation for this weighting was to discern the social mobility entry points for citizens who are socioeconomically underprivileged, rather than those who are already relatively wealthy.

First, we tested and showed that Economic Security and Subjective Poverty influence Social Mobility (Figure 30). Taken alongside the findings of higher Social Mobility in respondents with higher levels of education and in those who are currently employed, these findings provide evidence for the vicious cycles of poverty and inequality faced by people in the region, as well as their intergenerational transmission[72].



Figure 30: Linear regression results for the drivers of Social Mobility among respondents aged 18 to 35. Red arrows indicate negative drivers, green arrows positive drivers. Among 18-35 year olds, rurality and age negatively predict Social Mobility, with standardised beta weights of -0.080 and -0.10, respectively. Standardised beta weights shown, $p<0.05$. $R^2 = 0.29$.

[70] Latin American and Caribbean youth and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development: an examination from within the UN system. United Nations in the Caribbean. 2021.
[71] An Investment in Education Can Fuel the Caribbean's Growth. Lilia Burunciuc, World Bank Group. 2021.
[72] Regional Human Development Report 2021. Trapped: High Inequality and Low Growth in Latin America and the Caribbean. UNDP. 2021.

However, the more interesting relationships are those which we discover after accounting for the effects of Subjective Poverty and Economic Security. The impact of these drivers, described below, remains prevalent despite controlling for determinants such as Economic Security and Subjective Poverty, and this indicates that these drivers are direct entry points for improving Social Mobility in younger people.

Access to Business Opportunities in the community is a key entry point for increasing Social Mobility in younger people (Figure 30), and is a specific driver unique to this age group. The more there are opportunities within the community for people to start their own businesses, the more people feel that social mobility is possible.

Personal Security[73] and Negative Community Dynamics[74] are both linked to Social Mobility demonstrating the disproportionate impact that violence has on the most vulnerable, amplifying and perpetuating inequality[75]. Personal Security is the strongest positive predictor of Social Mobility, and the more Personal Security that individuals feel, the higher they score on Social Mobility. Given that this is a stronger predictor than even the economic indicators mentioned above, it emerges that Social Mobility is more sensitively defined by one's feeling of safety rather than wealth or poverty. Negative Community Dynamics is only a significant driver in younger respondents, indicating the importance of breaking this cycle in young people.

Coexistence at the household and community level are also important for Social Mobility, seen from the positive impact that Intergroup Harmony and Family Cohesion have, with the latter being a unique driver in people aged 18 to 35. This further validates the link between social cohesion and Social Mobility where Social Mobility was a driver of Intergroup Trust.

A stronger Sense of Agency and having positive views about the progress of the country are linked to higher levels of Social Mobility. This indicates that citizens may face intersectional barriers, where systemic exclusion from civic or sociopolitical life and inequality reinforce each other. However, these drivers are relatively weaker than the ones previously discussed, meaning they could inform policies aiming to increase social mobility, but might not be worth focussing on as the key entry-point

Of these drivers, Age, Access to Business Opportunities, Family Cohesion, Negative Community Dynamics, and Sense of Agency are unique in respondents under the age of 35, demonstrating the value of targeted interventions aimed at this group.

For individuals aged 36 and above, key factors uniquely linked to higher Social Mobility include service provision and Trust in Institutions, Economic Privilege and Food Security. This suggests that, with age, Social Mobility and the availability of basic needs become

[73] The extent to which respondents feel safe from violence in their daily life, feel safe walking alone in the street at night, feel that children in their community are safe from violence, feel confident that the police and other institutions can protect them from violence, and believe that the justice system is effective in dealing with crime.
[74] The extent to which respondents perceive that very loud arguments or fights, the sale of drugs, easy access to weapons, and gang presence happen frequently in their community.
[75] UNDP. (2021). Regional human development report 2021: Trapped—High inequality and low growth in Latin America and the Caribbean.

increasingly interconnected—limited Social Mobility not only restricts access to essential services, food security, and institutional trust but also perpetuates the cycle of inaccessibility, further entrenching social inequalities as people grow older.

Economic Security

More than half of all respondents feel that they have a safe level of basic income to some extent (Figure 31). Though the majority suggest they are not concerned, over one third (38%) of respondents fear that they may become or remain unemployed, equivalent to 42% of younger respondents and 34% of those over the age of 36. Economic Security is correlated with higher levels of Wellbeing[76], Family Cohesion[77], Safe and Peaceful Childhood[78], and lower levels of Depression and Anxiety[79]. Economic Security is also linked to lower levels of Exposure to Domestic Violence[80]. Taken alongside the impact of Personal Security and Negative Community Dynamics on Social Mobility, this demonstrates the link between economic indicators and cycles of violence.



Figure 31: Frequencies of Economic Security.

The largest proportion of respondents (between 30% and 55%) in all countries except The Bahamas report that they can afford food and clothes but not more expensive goods (Figure 32). In The Bahamas, the largest proportion of respondents (42%) say that they can afford a car or other goods of similar cost when needed. Dominica contains the largest number of respondents who cannot afford food or clothes – equivalent to 40% of those surveyed – followed by 35% in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 33% in Jamaica, and 30% in Saint Lucia. There are no gender differences in Subjective Poverty. It is also worth noting the rather alarming proportions of people not able to afford food, who face serious food security

[76] Pearson correlation coefficient, r = 0.40, p < 0.01.
[77] Pearson correlation coefficient, r = 0.44, p < 0.01.
[78] Pearson correlation coefficient, r = 0.36, p < 0.01.
[79] Pearson correlation coefficient, r = -0.32, p < 0.01.
[80] Pearson correlation coefficient, r = -0.35, p < 0.01.

challenges due to their economic situation. This proportion is highest in Dominica, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Jamaica (10%, 9%, and 8% respectively). Social Mobility and opportunities for escaping the cycle of poverty are obviously most critical for these groups, which reinforces why the model excluded upper-people and weighted down middle-class people.



Figure 32: Frequencies of Subjective Poverty by country.

Over one third (39%) of respondents report that people in their community are often or always able to start their own businesses, a key driver of Social Mobility in younger respondents. There are no age differences in perceptions about business opportunities. Differences arise based on urbanity. Respondents living in capital cities are much more likely to perceive that there are business opportunities available in their community[81] (Table 12). Business opportunities are low in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Dominica and Saint Lucia (Table 12).

[81] ANOVA, $p < 0.01$, $F = 90$, Cohen's d between capital and other towns = 0.45, between capital and rural settlements = 0.65.

Table 12: Percentage of people who believe there are business opportunities in their community, by country, age and urbanity.

% "often" + "always"	18 to 35 y/o			36+ y/o			All ages
	Capital	Other town	Rural	Capital	Other town	Rural	All settlement types
Full sample	59%	35%	29%	57%	31%	33%	39%
Bahamas	29%	41%		29%	40%		40%
Belize	58%	56%	48%	43%	41%	58%	50%
Dominica	6%	12%	18%	13%	11%	21%	17%
Jamaica	67%	27%	25%	68%	28%	32%	40%
St Lucia	13%	32%	20%	8%	33%	16%	25%
SVG	10%	5%	15%	11%	0%	13%	13%
T&T	94%	36%	37%	83%	30%	34%	38%

Identifying Groups with Low Economic Inclusion

Beyond Social Mobility, the SCORE measured several economic indicators relevant to the economic inclusion of citizens in the Caribbean. By identifying the demographic groups who score lower in these indicators, it becomes possible to target interventions with a specific beneficiary group in mind, ensuring that the most vulnerable citizens are reached through programmes seeking to build economic inclusion.

Respondents who have not completed secondary school, those who are unemployed, including people who are not in employment, education or training (NEET), and respondents who cannot afford food or clothes report disparities on multiple economic indicators including Social Mobility (Table 13).

Table 13: Mean scores in different economic indicators by demographic group. Bold text indicates significantly lower score of that group in that indicator. Statistically significant differences are those with F>20, p<0.05 and Cohen's d>0.4 between any pair of groups. Men and women not shown separately as there are no significant differences in these indicators.

	Economic Privilege	Economic Security	Food Security	No Reliant on Income from Relatives Abroad	Perceived Purchasing Power	Social Mobility
Full Sample	5.6	5.8	8.8	7.4	5.3	6.2
Capital	6.9	6.8	8.9	6.6	5.3	6.1
Other town	6.0	6.4	9.0	7.7	5.6	6.3
Rural	**5.1**	6.4	8.6	7.6	5.1	6.2
Persons with Disabilities	5.1	**5.7**	8.5	6.4	**4.1**	6.1
Persons without Disabilities	5.8	6.6	8.9	7.5	5.4	6.3
Incomplete Secondary	**5.2**	**6.0**	8.5	**6.9**	**4.2**	**5.9**
Complete Secondary	5.8	6.5	8.9	7.5	5.5	6.3
University	7.1	7.5	9.4	8.4	7.4	7.1
Cannot afford food or clothes	**4.8**	**5.3**	**8.2**	**6.6**	2.0	**5.3**
Can afford food and clothes but not expensive goods	5.6	6.5	8.7	7.4	5.0	6.2
Can afford expensive goods	7.0	7.5	9.5	8.2	8.7	7.2
Unemployed	5.4	**5.9**	8.6	**6.7**	**4.5**	5.8
Employed	6.2	7.0	9.1	8.1	6.0	6.6
Under 29 EET	6.1	6.6	9.2	7.8	6.1	6.4
Under 29 NEET	**4.7**	**5.5**	8.1	6.6	**4.4**	**5.4**
30 to 59 EET	6.2	7.1	9.1	8.0	6.0	6.7
30 to 59 NEET	**5.0**	**5.8**	8.5	7.0	**4.2**	**5.6**

Persons with disabilities [82]report lower Economic Security and Perceived Purchasing Power[83] than persons without disabilities. Persons with disabilities are twice as likely to report that they do not have a safe basic income, with 29% saying they do not feel this at all, compared to 15% of persons without disabilities (Figure 33). They are also three times more likely to say they fear they will become or remain unemployed, which is reflected in the literature[84], with 27% saying they fear this very much, compared to 8% of those without disabilities. Persons with disabilities are also more likely to say that their household cannot even afford food – reported by 16% compared to 5% of those without disabilities.

[82]People who self-report and self-identify themselves as living with a disability.
[83] The reverse of the Subjective Poverty indicator.
[84] Stephenson, J. H., & Persadie, N. (2022). Experiences of Disabled Persons in Employment in the Caribbean Region. In *Disability in the Workplace: A Caribbean Perspective* (pp. 215-237). Cham: Springer International Publishing.



Figure 33: Frequencies of Economic Security, reliance on remittances and reliability of social payments by disability status.



Figure 34: Mean scores of Provision of Services, 0 to 10.

Echoes of Colonialism: Structural Barriers, Economic Privilege and Marginalisation in the Caribbean:

Following the in-depth calibration process of the SCORE in the Caribbean, local experts and civil society identified the importance of privilege, hierarchies and barriers, inherited across generations. The SCORE developed these indicators, specific to the Caribbean region, to understand these dynamics. By understanding which respondents report lower Economic Privilege and higher barriers or marginalisation, we can identify which areas, countries or groups face the most challenges such that policies and interventions can be designed to alleviate these.

Rural respondents report lower Economic Privilege than people living in urban areas. While 36% of people living in capitals say it is very easy to access good quality education or training, this is true for just 19% of rural respondents, of which one in four (21%) report a lot of barriers. Social connections for education or employment are also scarcer for rural respondents, with 18% saying these are easy to access, compared to 33% of those in capitals. This is also true for financial support from their family, easy to access by 28% of rural respondents compared to 40% of respondents living in capitals. The divide between people living in capitals and elsewhere is evident in most countries (Figure 35). At the subregional level, as is familiar to those living in the region, respondents outside the capitals also report lower service provision (Figure 34).

Economic Privilege is lower in Dominica[85] and Jamaica than other countries[86] and is higher in The Bahamas[87]. Just 23% of respondents in Dominica and Jamaica can access financial support from family members, compared to 62% in The Bahamas. In Dominica, only 11% of respondents say that they do not experience barriers when accessing good quality education or training, or social connections for education or employment.



Figure 35: Mean scores of Economic Privilege, 0 to 10.

[85] ANOVA, p <0.05, F =5, Cohen's d = 0.37
[86] ANOVA, p < 0.01, F = 150, Cohen's d = 0.44
[87] ANOVA, p < 0.01, F = 126, Cohen's d = 0.76

To what extent do you experience challenges when accessing the following...



Figure 36: Frequencies of Economic Privilege by country.

Respondents in Dominica[88] and Jamaica[89] also report the highest levels of barriers due to the colonial past (Figure 37); just 24% and 20% believe that colonial practices do not have a negative impact on how they are treated by other people, while just 18% and 19% believe that these practices do not affect their access to opportunities (Figure 38).

[88] ANOVA, $p < 0.05$, $F = 4$, Cohen's $d = 0.32$
[89] ANOVA, $p < 0.01$, $F = 168$, Cohen's $d = 0.47$



Figure 37: Mean scores, Experience of Barriers due to Colonial Past, 0 to 10.

To what extent do you agree...



Figure 38: Frequencies of Experience of Barriers due to Colonial Past, by country.

Marginalisation is also higher in Dominica[90], where almost one in two respondents (46%) have ever been marginalised due to any characteristic, followed by Saint Vincent and the

[90] ANOVA, $p < 0.01$, $F = 24$, Cohen's $d = 0.80$.

Grenadines, where any form of marginalisation is reported by 32% (Table 14). In Dominica, marginalisation due to political opinions is high, experienced by 21% of respondents. Overall, the most common forms of marginalisation are one's income level (7%), political opinions (6%), or skin colour (6%). At the subregional level, for those who have ever been marginalised, this most often occurs in public and recreational spaces (36%), followed by at school or work (28%), although up to 9% of those who have ever experienced marginalisation say this has happened within their household. One in four people in the region (24%) have ever felt discriminated due to at least one characteristic, suggesting that experiences of marginalisation are common in the subregion, hence the need to address multiple forms of discrimination and social exclusion (Figure 39).

Table 14: Proportion of respondents who report ever being discriminated against, by country.

Have you ever felt discriminated due to the following reasons? *% "to some extent" + "very much"*	Full Sample	Bahamas	Belize	Dominica	Jamaica	St Lucia	SVG	T&T
Level of Income	7%	4%	2%	11%	10%	8%	10%	2%
Political Opinions	6%	6%	3%	21%	7%	10%	13%	2%
Skin Colour	6%	4%	8%	12%	6%	6%	5%	5%
Religious Beliefs	5%	1%	3%	17%	6%	6%	10%	4%
Ethnicity	4%	2%	8%	11%	2%	2%	3%	6%
Age	3%	4%	1%	9%	4%	4%	2%	1%
Gender	3%	3%	0%	5%	3%	3%	5%	1%
Language	1%	2%	1%	3%	1%	1%	1%	1%
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	2%	1%	1%
Disability	1%	1%	0%	1%	1%	0%	1%	0%
Due to at least one characteristic	24%	20%	23%	46%	26%	27%	32%	18%



Figure 39: Frequencies of places of marginalisation, for respondents who have ever been marginalised due to any characteristic.

Recommendations

There are cycles of inequality and lower Social Mobility, exacerbated among respondents with low socioeconomic status. These are amplified and perpetuated by the impact of violence and lack of community safety on the most vulnerable, particularly among young people, given that personal and community security are drivers of Social Mobility. Focus on improving the Social Mobility of younger people, aiming to break cycles of inequality by ensuring community safety and reduction of violence, and by ensuring tangible economic opportunities exist in communities. Ensuring that young people have Access to Business Opportunities is a key entry point for improving Social Mobility.

Positive intergroup and family relations are drivers of Social Mobility. Proper socialisation and support networks, both within the family and with a wide array of community members can generate opportunities for Social Mobility. Particularly, positive relations with people from social outgroups (different ethnic, social, and economic backgrounds) seem to be a strong driver of Social Mobility, indicating that there is a key importance in ensuring that communities are not isolated but are networked, and that different people from diverse backgrounds interact frequently.

Establish community-based violence prevention programmes, particularly in areas with high levels of inequality and low Social Mobility. These programmes should focus on supporting vulnerable young people, offering safe spaces, mentorship, and pathways to education and employment to break the cycles of violence and inequality.

Respondents with lower educational attainment and those who are unemployed report disparities on multiple economic indicators, not limited to their current economic situation but also spreading to longer term factors that affect inequality, such as Economic Privilege and Social Mobility. Implement targeted education and vocational training programmes; particularly in Dominica, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Lucia, and Jamaica, aimed at individuals with lower educational attainment and who are currently unemployed.

Focus programmes on skills building, in tandem with assessments of the skills deficits in their local communities, improving skills that are in demand in local job markets. Programmes can also include sponsorship for apprenticeships for young people or developing platforms to match young people with employers based on their skills.

Encourage entrepreneurship and access to business opportunities for people under 35 through microfinance schemes, business incubators, and mentorship programmes.

Intersectional barriers and systemic exclusion from sociopolitical life, exist alongside economic inequality and reinforce it. Improving access to civic platforms and empowering all young people, go together with higher levels of Social Mobility. Create platforms for political and civic engagement, particularly for marginalised groups and young people. This could include youth councils, online forums, and community meetings where all voices are heard and considered in decision-making processes.

Set up programmes for youth that provide opportunities to interact with people beyond their immediate social network, such as student exchanges which cut across neighbourhoods, communities or regions.

In areas where Family Cohesion is low, design interventions which focus on family healing, building family solidarity to achieve economic progress. This might include follow-on interventions on family- or community-based social enterprises.

Marginalisation is highest in Dominica, where people particularly feel marginalised due to their political opinions, followed by Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. Overall, respondents who have ever felt marginalised are most likely to say that this is due to their income, and that this has occurred in public and recreational spaces. In Dominica and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, particularly focus on reducing marginalisation by ensuring that political opinions and low income are not barriers to participation in public life. This could involve public campaigns to promote inclusivity and fairness in both political and recreational spaces.

There is a divide between people living in capitals and those living elsewhere when it comes to Economic Privilege and access to services. Continue to develop infrastructure and service delivery outside capitals to reduce the divide in Economic Privilege and access to services. This could include mobile health clinics, online education, and remote job opportunities to ensure that people living outside capitals have equal opportunities to those within.

Persons with disabilities report lower Economic Security and purchasing power, and an unexpectedly high proportion are unable to afford even food. Increase financial support and social services for persons with disabilities, ensuring they have access to essential needs. Additionally, create employment opportunities tailored to their abilities, and ensure that workplaces are accessible and inclusive.

Chapter 2. Constructive Civic Behaviour

Constructive civic behaviour is a form of healthy and positive citizenship, where an individual participates in civic, community, and political life, and holds values such as mutual respect, support for human rights and democratic norms[91], and the rejection of violence. The SCORE understands constructive civic behaviour in the Caribbean (and in many other contexts) to require two general aspects: active participation, and avoidance of violence. This chapter adopts this definition and measures constructive civic behaviour by assessing both civic and community engagement, support for democratic values, and indicators tracking individual violent attitudes. The first part of the chapter will look at active participation, using indicators called Civic Engagement and Community Cooperation, which track an individual's engagement with civic, political and community processes. The second half of the chapter will focus on violent tendencies using a composite indicator called Individual Violent Attitudes, made up of Aggression, Tendency towards Violence and Political Violence. These indicators and their relationships and drivers will be investigated in detail in the sections that follow.

Generally, constructive citizenship behaviours among the population of a country offers multiple societal benefits. Constructive citizenship provides avenues for addressing grievances that might otherwise lead to violence[92], promotes political equality and social cohesion[93], and enhances democratic governance[94]. Healthy participation in civic and political processes also helps to reinforce the social contract, as citizens make collective demands from institutions and decisionmakers, hold them accountable, and reinforce the social contract. Many in the Caribbean feel left behind, and opportunities for participation and engagement are sometimes restricted for certain groups who are less privileged.

These benefits illustrate the broader importance of encouraging active and constructive participation in civic and community life. Fostering constructive citizenship is also a key component of the United Nations' Global Education First Initiative[95], which stresses the importance of developing informed and engaged citizens who can effectively participate in democratic processes and contribute to sustainable development.

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[91] Hoskins, B. L. (2006). Draft framework on indicators for active citizenship Ispra. *Italy: CRELL*.
[92] Pearce, J. V. (2007). Violence, power and participation: Building citizenship in contexts of chronic violence.
[93] Verba, S., Schlozman, K. L., & Brady, H. E. (1995). *Voice and equality: Civic voluntarism in American politics*. Harvard University Press.
[94] Bauböck, Rainer. (2010). "Changing the boundaries of citizenship: the inclusion of immigrants in democratic polities." *Selected studies in international migration and immigrant incorporation* 1: 275-314.
[95] United Nations. (n.d.). Global Education First Initiative (GEFI).

At the same time, individual violent attitudes contribute to the cycles of violence that exist in some communities of the Caribbean. Attitudes that normalize the participation in violence, and a preference for using violence or aggression to resolve day-to-day, interpersonal or community issues, may lead to social fragility, with any potential dispute or flash-point potentially triggering a violent response.

In the context of the English-speaking Caribbean, constructive citizenship holds particular significance. CARICOM emphasises that democratic practices and effective citizen participation are vital components of good governance[96]. Civic engagement can foster social, ecological, and economic development while promoting democratic institutions in the region[97]. Moreover, community cooperation forms an element of community resilience, while violent attitudes contribute to fragility and community fragmentation. Given the Caribbean's disproportionate vulnerability to natural disasters exacerbated by climate change[98], fostering community resilience through cooperation is crucial[99]. For all of these reasons, an active and engaged citizenry that cooperates to solve community challenges, but also involves itself in national political processes, while avoiding the use of violence or aggression, is a vital aspect of building social cohesion in the Caribbean.

Having established the importance of constructive citizenship in the Caribbean, this chapter explores how to build constructive citizenship in the English-speaking Caribbean. In the first section, we examine the positive and negative drivers of civic and community engagement. By understanding what the underlying factors might be to facilitate the growth of civic engagement, or those which are key barriers to participation, we can design interventions aimed at reducing civic apathy and encouraging social and political engagement. Furthermore, we also present scores relevant to support for democratic norms.

In the second section, we present measurements of levels of aggression and normalization of violence, which are generally low, and then also discover entry points to reduce it further. Such analyses could be used to design aspects of violence reduction and community security programmes, such as CariSECURE 2.0, and particularly those programmes which integrate a social dimension to security dynamics. Disaggregations of scores in various indicators related to constructive civic behaviour are presented throughout the chapter where relevant. Such data can help target interventions to particular social groups, or tailor programmes by country.

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[96] CARICOM. (n.d.). Vision, Mission and Core Values.

[97] Tewarie, B. (1998). Which Globalization?: Opening Spaces for Civic Engagement. *Iberoamericana–Nordic Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies*, *28*(1-2).

[98] USDA. (n.d.). Caribbean Hub Climate Vulnerability Assessment.

[99] Aldrich, D. P., & Meyer, M. A. (2015). Social capital and community resilience. *American behavioral scientist*, *59*(2), 254-269.

The results of a predictive model demonstrate a strong link between constructive citizenship outcomes, with indicators such as Trust in Institutions, Family Cohesion, Exposure to Violence, Presence of Local Leaders, Intergroup Contact, and Sense of Agency. Additionally, Civic Engagement is influenced by factors like Religiosity, Political Violence, and Economic Privilege, while Community Cooperation is driven by Intergroup Trust.

Section I. Fostering Civic Engagement and Community Cooperation: Building Stronger Societies

Levels of Civic Engagement and Community Cooperation

Given the highly contextual nature of such phenomena, the SCORE designed the civic engagement and community cooperation indicators following several consultations with researchers and civil society organisations, such that they were contextually appropriate for the Caribbean. For civic engagement, participants were queried about the frequency of their involvement in a range of activities such as discussing politics and current events, participating in religious organisations and cultural activities, volunteering, joining public demonstrations, and attending events organised by local authorities or political parties. In terms of community engagement, participants were asked about their participation in activities such as socialising and organising social events with neighbours (*"liming"*, in some countries), assisting neighbours, providing food or water to people in need, improving their neighbourhoods, lending or borrowing money from neighbours, supporting charities, and aiding people affected by natural disasters.

Figure 40 shows the scores of Civic Engagement scores in the region, where 0 implies that on average citizens have not ever participated in any of the activities we asked about, and 10 implies that all citizens participate in all events on a daily basis[100]. A score of around 3 implies on average that people participate about once a year. As such, the scores imply a low level of civic engagement, but not total apathy and disengagement. Table 15 which shows the frequencies of specific activities, reveals the most frequent forms of engagement: 65% of Caribbean residents discuss politics and current events, and 59% participate in religious organisations more than once or twice a year. The least popular engagement activities are participating in public demonstrations and events organised by political parties, with only 15% and 17% of the population engaging in these activities more than once or twice a year, respectively. Overall, engagement that is linked to political

[100] Based on their answers to the Civic Engagement items, respondents get the following scorings: "Never" = 0, "Less than once a year" = 1.67, "Once or twice a year" = 3.33, "Once or twice per quarter" = 5, "Once or twice per month" = 6.66, "Once of twice per week" = 8.33, "Nearly every day" = 10. The mean of a respondents answers is taken across all seven activities, and then the mean of each country or group is taken. As such, a score of 4 or 5 might be the score of someone who is somewhat active and engaged, and a score of 7 might be the score of someone who is very engaged indeed. A score of 8 or above is unlikely, few have the time to be participating in several kinds of events on a nearly daily basis.

processes, political parties, authorities, are much less popular than engagement organized through non-political organisations (such as religious or sporting organisations).

Dominica has the highest level of Civic Engagement with a score of 2.6, while Belize has the lowest at 1.5. Belize also reports lower frequencies in all activities compared to other islands. Regarding demographic differences, Civic Engagement is higher among those who have completed university education. Additionally, engagement levels are slightly lower in 18-30 year olds compared to those aged 30-49 and 50+. There are no significant gender differences in the levels of Civic Engagement.



Figure 40: Heatmap of mean scores for Civic Engagement on a scale from 0 to 10.

	Full Sample	Bahamas	Belize	Dominica	Jamaica	St. Lucia	SVG	T&T
Discuss politics and current events	**65%**	71%	40%	67%	63%	53%	61%	75%
Participate in religious organisations or related activities	**59%**	66%	52%	63%	52%	44%	58%	73%
Participate in organised cultural activities or sports activities	**40%**	32%	34%	49%	40%	34%	42%	42%
Participate in activities of volunteer associations, NGO, CSO, etc	**25%**	25%	12%	38%	28%	33%	31%	22%
Attend events organised by local authorities	**23%**	22%	10%	41%	30%	24%	29%	10%
Participate in events organised by political parties	**17%**	27%	8%	19%	22%	16%	20%	7%
Participate in public demonstrations	**15%**	7%	4%	19%	12%	15%	14%	25%

Table 15: Frequency of responses for Civic Engagement by country. Share of people who take part in various activities at least once or twice a year.

Community Cooperation in the Caribbean is higher than Civic Engagment, with an average score of 4.6[101]. Jamaica has the highest score at 5.2, while the Bahamas has the lowest at 3.4. The most popular activities are liming with neighbours and helping neighbours with daily tasks, with 62% and 60% of the sample engaging in these activities more than once or twice a year, respectively. In contrast, only 11% help people affected by natural disasters more than once or twice a year, likely due to the infrequency of such events. There are no significant demographic differences in the levels of community cooperation. Table 16 shows responses for each of the community cooperation activities that we asked about.

The responses of individuals across the region to community cooperation questions, as displayed in Table 16, shows that there is a rather good level of engagement and support within the community. Given that conflicts and violence in the Caribbean are generally intra-communal and at the neighbourhood level, strong community bonds are important for mitigating the effect of violence, as well as economic instability or poor state support. Also,

[101] Based on their answers to the Community Cooperation items, respondents get the following scorings: "Never" = 0, "Done this in the past, but not in the last year" = 2.5, "Once or twice in the last year" = 5, "Several times this year" = 7.5, "More than once a month" = 10. The mean of a respondents answers is taken across all seven activities, and then the mean of each country or group is taken. As such, a score of 5 might be the score of someone who is somewhat active and engaged, and a score of 7 or 8 might be the score of someone who is very engaged indeed. A score of 9 or above is unlikely, few have the time to be participating in several kinds of events on a monthly basis.

community cooperation involves supporting individuals who might be in need when there is no social safety net: note that 32% of people have lent money to someone in the last year, which is a rather large proportion. As such, high community cooperation is a resilience factor protecting against challenges a community may be facing.



Figure 41: Heatmap of mean scores for Community Cooperation on a scale from 0 to 10.

In the past year, how often have you…?	**Full Sample**	Bahamas	Belize	Dominica	Jamaica	St. Lucia	SVG	T&T
Limed with neighbours	**62%**	44%	48%	51%	72%	51%	60%	51%
Helped neighbours with daily tasks	**50%**	33%	41%	57%	57%	59%	57%	42%
Gave food water to people	**45%**	33%	41%	58%	52%	65%	63%	30%
Supported charities/fundraising	**35%**	34%	43%	37%	40%	43%	49%	22%
Organised or participated in a social activity with neighbours	**32%**	11%	25%	37%	40%	37%	35%	24%
Supported efforts to improve neighbourhood	**32%**	12%	29%	41%	38%	45%	39%	26%
Lent money to or borrowed from a neighbour	**32%**	15%	23%	26%	44%	26%	31%	17%
Helped people affected by natural disaster	**11%**	5%	12%	17%	15%	16%	14%	4%

Table 16: Frequency of responses for Community Cooperation by country. Share of people who take part at at least 'once or twice a year'.



Figure 42: Linear regression results at subregional level for the drivers of Community Cooperation and Civic Engagement. Red arrows indicate negative drivers, blue arrows indicate positive drivers. Age and Employment Status have a positive effect on community cooperation, with standardised beta weights of 0.10 and 0.08 respectively.

Drivers	Community Cooperation	Civic Engagement
Trust in Institutions	-0.13	0.16
Family Cohesion	0.21	0.11
Exposure to Violence	0.22	0.14
Sense of Agency	0.07	0.21
Intergroup Contact	0.10	0.10
Presence of Local Leaders	0.09	0.10
Economic Privilege		-0.09
Political Violence		0.09
Intergroup Trust	0.14	
Religiosity		0.14
Voting History		0.05
Social Tolerance		0.07
Barriers due to Colonial Past	-0.06	

Table 17: Linear regression results for the drivers of Community Cooperation and Civic Engagement. The value in each cell gives the strength of the predictive pathway (normalised coefficient, β) of the driver in that row onto the outcome in that column. Blank cells imply that predictive pathway was tested, found to be non-significant and was then omitted from the final model. Values larger than 0.12 should be considered large, values less than 0.08 should be considered small or marginal. Controlled for country, age, gender, education level, employment groups. CFI = 0.996, TLI = 0.965.

Drivers of Civic Engagement and Community Cooperation

A predictive analysis was run to identify which underlying factors may predict a higher or lower level of civic engagement and community cooperation, based on various hypotheses that the consultative SCORE design process elicited from participating stakeholders. The analysis discovered that several common factors underpin both aspects of constructive citizenship, while also identifying unique factors which only affect one of the two outcomes. These are shown in Table 17 and Figure 42. By understanding these drivers and root causes, better policies can be designed which target these two constructive citizenship outcomes.

One prominent driver is **Trust in Institutions**, which shows a positive relationship with Civic Engagement (0.17) but a negative relationship with Community Cooperation (-0.13). This means that encouraging higher trust in institutions may lead to more Civic Engagement, but less Community Cooperation. The more citizens trust state institutions, the more they tend to express their involvement in civic and political engagement, and not through community activities. Conversely, those who

feel more distant from state institutions tend to channel their engagement into more informal community solidarity activities. In the Caribbean, one's relationship with and perception of, institutions, affects how one might prefer to engage.

Table 18 shows country-level frequencies of trust in various institutions. According to the findings, the institutions all English-speaking Caribbean countries trust the least are parliaments/national assemblies and political parties. The most trusted institutions are religious leaders, CSOs/NGOs and the media. The high level of trust in the media is in contrast to other countries where the SCORE was deployed (such as Ukraine, Moldova, or Bosnia and Herzegovina). There, the media is considered slightly untrustworthy as it is a polarized political battleground, where disinformation sometimes appears. The countries with the lowest levels of trust in institutions overall are Saint Lucia (4.2) and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (4.3), as shown in the map in Figure 43. Considering Trust in Institutions' link to improving civic engagement, these countries should prioritise measures to improve trust in institutions in efforts to improve levels of civic engagement.

	Full Sample	Bahamas	Belize	Dominica	Jamaica	St. Lucia	SVG	T&T
Religious Leaders	69%	83%	74%	65%	63%	55%	54%	77%
Civil Society Organisations/NGOs	59%	72%	72%	61%	53%	55%	52%	64%
Media	57%	79%	68%	51%	51%	55%	48%	62%
Courts of Law	53%	73%	60%	48%	54%	43%	48%	48%
Police	52%	74%	58%	47%	47%	51%	43%	56%
Parliament/National Assembly/House of Assembly	45%	59%	60%	42%	42%	39%	42%	44%
Political Parties	38%	49%	40%	33%	38%	32%	37%	36%

Table 18: Frequency of responses for Trust in Institutions by country. Somewhat Trust + Fully Trust



Figure 43: Heatmap of mean scores for Trust in Institutions on a scale from 0 to 10.

The following drivers positively influence both outcomes, making them essential for designing interventions and policies aimed at efficiently increasing civic engagement and community cooperation. Family Cohesion emerges as the most significant driver of Community Cooperation, while Sense of Agency is the strongest driver of Civic Engagement. The SCORE methodology's ability to assess the strength of these drivers allows for prioritisation in targeted interventions and policy designs, especially when resources or time are limited.

Family Cohesion emerges as a positive driver for both Civic Engagement and Community Cooperation. This indicates that strong family ties and support networks play a crucial role in promoting participation in both civic and community activities, with a more pronounced effect on Community Cooperation. It is important to note that Family Cohesion is lower for those with incomplete secondary education, those who cannot afford food or clothes, and those who have experienced marginalisation. This suggests that socioeconomic challenges and experiences of exclusion can weaken family bonds, potentially hindering the positive impact of family cohesion on engagement.

Exposure to Violence also positively impacts both Civic Engagement (0.19) and Community Cooperation (0.12). This relationship may reflect a response mechanism where individuals affected by violence become more engaged in their

communities and civic processes to seek change and support. Conversely, those less affected by it might tend to be more apathetic. This finding implies that engagement is resilient to exposure to violence, and that violence in a community will not undermine desire for participation and engagement, but might even generate it. Awareness campaigns around the urgency of addressing certain forms of violence may thus be an effective motivator among some communities.

The **Presence of Local Leaders** positively influences both Civic Engagement (0.10) and Community Cooperation (0.09), albeit to a slightly lesser extent. This underscores the importance of local leadership to be present and visible in their community, so as to foster an engaged citizenry by providing guidance, motivation, and organisational support. Conversely, poor local leadership may discourage citizens from participating either in political/civic engagement, or in supporting their communities. Development work which works with community leaders, youth leaders, religious leaders, and civil society leaders in general should stress the importance of remaining visible and accessible.

Intergroup Contact is another common driver, positively affecting both Civic (0.10) and Community Engagement (0.11). Intergroup contact measures the frequency with which an individual has meaningful social interaction with people from other ethnic, social, economic, or political groups, different from their own. This suggests that interaction among different groups within the community fosters a sense of unity and collective action, enhancing engagement across both civic and community domains. Notably, intergroup contact is higher among those who have completed university education and among urban residents. Migrants have a higher scoere than permanent residents. Between the countries, Trinidad & Tobago scores the lowest in Intergroup Contact with a score of 5.9.

Sense of Agency shows a strong positive relationship with Civic Engagement (0.20) and a significant but rather weak positive relationship with Community Cooperation (0.07). This indicates that individuals who feel empowered and capable of effecting change are more likely to participate in civic activities and, to a lesser extent, community activities. Figure 44 shows the full sample findings of respondents concerning Sense of Agency. According to the results, half of the sample does not believe that people like them can influence local government decisions. An intervention aiming to improve civic and community engagement can channel such sentiments and empower its citizens.



Figure 44: Frequencies of Sense of Agency, which is a key driver of Civic Engagement, and a secondary driver of Community Cooperation.

Overall, the strongest drivers for Community Cooperation are Family Cohesion and Exposure to Violence, meaning that any strategy seeking to improve community cooperation should integrate those two entry points into its planning. However, for Civic Engagement, the strongest drivers are Sense of Agency and Trust in Institutions.

Furthermore, there are certain drivers which are specific to Community Cooperation. These are **Intergroup Trust** which a coefficient of 0.13, indicating a positive effect on the outcome. Higher levels of intergroup trust can contribute to increased cooperation among community members from different backgrounds, while intergroup mistrust or tensions will undermine community cooperation and limit opportunities for engagement. The indicator **Experiencing Barriers due to Colonial Past** has a negative effect on Community Cooperation (-0.07), suggesting that historical barriers stemming from colonial legacies may pose challenges to fostering effective community cooperation.

Finally, there are also drivers which are specific to Civic Engagement. These include **Economic privilege**, which undermines Civic Engagement (-0.09). The negative relationship we discovered suggests that higher economic status may somewhat reduce motivation to participate in civic activities. In contrast, **Political Violence** (0.09) shows a significant positive relationship to civic engagement. This indicator measures a respondent's comfort with using violence to achieve certain political aims. The result implies that those who are open to using violence in politics are also strongly motivated to be engaged in civics, which is not unexpected.

Overall, drivers of the two citizenship outcomes do show statistically significant variation between the seven surveyed countries. In particular, Sense of agency and Contact with outgroups have the most variation, with the highest and lowest scoring

countries differring by 2 points or more. In Sense of Agency, Trinidad and Tobago scores rather low at only 4.6, while Dominica and Saint Lucia score 6.5 and 6.6 respectively. The other four countries score between 5.6 and 5.9. Given the importance of Sense of Agency as a strong driver of Civic engagement, strategies to improve it as part of a civic development intervention should consider the different baselines that each country starts from.

Democratic Values

For democracies to be healthy and political participation of citizens to contribute to social cohesion, there must be a general support for democratic values among the citizenry, rather than a tendency of support for authoritarian or antidemocratic sentiments. As such, the SCORE included an indicator measuring Support for Democratic Values in our understanding of Constructive Civic Behaviour. Our contextualised concept of democratic values for the Caribbean includes a preference of elections, debates and protests, to challenge and check the power of leaders, rather than a strong leader ruling without accountability to a parliament, the opposition, or the public.

Figure 45 shows the scores of Support for Democratic Values across the region. There is a wide difference in scores between higher-scoring countries like Belize (8.3) and the Bahamas (7.4) compared to lower-scoring countries like Jamaica (5.0) and Trinidad and Tobago (5.3). This implies that the state of democratic values is highly contextual and locally specific. Scores near 5 imply that the citizenry, on average, is lukewarm about democratic values, and place themselves approximately half-way between support for democratic values and support for authoritarian or anti-democratic values. Scores close to 8 and above imply a strong sense of alignment with core democratic principles of elections, protests, and checks on power. Few people in any of the countries has outright opposition to democratic values, but the situation in Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Saint Lucia is concerning, given their scores below 6, and implies an openness to strong authoritarian leaders with unchecked power. There are no significant gender differences on this indicator, although people living in rural areas have lower levels of democratic values. To take this into account, interventions may want to spread beyond urban centres, to focus on communities where more progress is needed.



Figure 45: Heatmap of scores of each country in the indicator Support for Democratic Values, on a scale from 0 to 10. Note the wide variation of scores across the countries.

	Bahamas	Belize	Dominica	Jamaica	St. Lucia	SVG	T&T
Strong leader (0) vs Elections and debates (10)	7.2	8.1	6.7	5.1	5.2	7.1	5.4
Authoritarian (0) vs Democratic (10)	7.2	8.6	6.2	5.2	5.5	6.8	5.1
Prohibiting (0) vs Allowing (10) Demonstrations	7.8	8.1	6.6	4.7	6.5	7.0	5.5

Table 19: Scores per country of three questions about democratic values. Higher scores imply stronger support for democratic values. Respondents were to position themselves on a 0 to 10 scale between two statement, where 0 corresponded to a statement signifying opposition to democratic values, and 10 corresponded to a statement in support of democratic values. In the first question, the statements were: "It is better to have a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections" (corresponds to 0), and "It is better to have elections and parliamentary debates, even if this means less powerful leadership" (corresponds to 10). For the second question, the statements where "I would accept an authoritarian government if it reduces crime" (corresponds to 0) and "I would prefer a democratic government, even if it fails to reduce crime" (corresponds to 10). For the third question the statements were: "It is more important to prohibit demonstrations against the government, so it can do its job better" (corresponds to 0) and "It is more important to allow demonstrations against the government, even if it creates delays" (corresponds to 10).

Table 19 shows the three specific questions which make up the support for democratic values indicator and presents the scores of each of the items in each country separately. There is a strong country variation, as in the overall indicator. Considering the lower-scoring countries, interventions may want to prioritise the lower-scoring items within those countries. For example, in Jamaica, it may be of

priority to encourage support for allowing demonstrations against the government, or to understand why they are rejected. In Saint Lucia focus should be placed on the other two items, with focus on turning people away from the lure of strong authoritarian leaders, even if they are perceived, by some, to "*make the trains run on time*".

Recommendations

Overall, the SCORE results suggest that Community Cooperation is relatively high, and that people do spend some time interacting and socializing with their neighbours and supporting other community members. At least once a year, nearly half of respondents have given food or water to their neighbours, and more than half have helped them with daily tasks and limed with them. This indicates strong social cohesion and community participation at the grassroots level and should be leveraged to achieve other social goals. Interventions which seek to engage people on any social dimension should consider taking a community and grass-roots approach, engaging informal groups or organisations, and capitalizing on the rich informal social networks that certain individuals might have. These networks might be totally disconnected from outward-facing NGOs, and so donors should look to assess local partner organisations on their embeddedness in local communities if they want to leverage this social connectedness. In countries or locations where Community Cooperation is lower, emphasis should be placed on building Intergroup Trust and Family Cohesion, as they are key drivers of this outcome.

On the other hand, civic and political engagement is much weaker across the region. More than half of the respondents have never participated in NGO/CSO activities (59%), nor in events of local authorities (59%), nor in events of political parties (67%) or public demonstrations (75%). This means that a sizable majority can be considered fully apathetic and disengaged from civic or political engagement, with only a small minority of people engaging enough to be considered potential activists or change-makers. Firstly, this implies that engagement through religious, cultural or sporting events or organisations might have greater reach, and should form the starting point of interventions seeking to generate participation in civic or political engagement. Secondly, the low score of civic engagement overall motivates using the SCORE to discover entry-points and validate theories of change which seek to increase it.

Those entry-points for civic engagement, include increasing trust in institutions and sense of agency. Work must start from the institutions that have a role in civic engagement and are also trusted relatively less. These are political parties and parliament, which were the only institutions to have a majority of citizens mistrusting them, among those we asked about. Initiatives such as opening opportunities for citizens to interact with politicians and parliamentarians, in the form of debates and open discussions, which can also be televised, might be a way to rekindle participation, trust, agency, and a meaningful link between citizen and politicians. The accessibility and presence of local leaders in the community was also found to be a driver of engagement, corroborating the utility of such ideas.

Regarding Sense of Agency, it is surprising that less than half of people (48%) feel they can influence local government decision, but 58% feel they can change their country. This might

imply that a key issue is the lack of opportunities for citizens to interact with local government, or local governments lack of capacity to engage meaningfully. Local leaders should spend more time engaging with and listening to their constituents, and they should be empowered to take the initiative to implement some of those desires, which might imply also a need to decentralise some decision-making to a lower level of government.

Also, interventions aiming to build civic engagement should recognise that exposure to violence can be a flashpoint to begin engagement, as does the lack of economic privilege. Targeting communities where such challenges exist and granting them opportunities for civic participation and political engagement could prove very successful, as they have real issues to advocate for. Intergroup contact and family cohesion are also key drivers, although of secondary importance. Consider integrating these into strategies as supplementary dimensions.

The SCORE data also reveals that each country has a specific combination of strengths and weaknesses when it comes to the aspects of constructive citizenship. Regional programmes on improving citizenship and democracy should target different key concepts in different countries. For each country, a very tailored strategy should be designed, based on the specific challenges that each country faces. The SCORE can also be used to suggest partnerships across the region. For examples, lessons can be learnt from Belize on building democratic values (where it scores high), while it could learn from others on how to build Civic Engagement. Similarly, Jamaica can be an example to help other countries understand how to build Community Cooperation, but it is worth engaging with Belize given its low score on democratic values and Belize's much higher score.

Section II. Reducing Individual Violent Attitudes to Break the Cycle of Violence

Approximately 40 percent of the Caribbean population views crime and security issues as the most pressing concern in their countries, surpassing concerns about poverty or inequality[102]. Since 2007, several Caribbean nations have experienced a significant increase in crime, with homicide rates more than doubling[103]. SCORE data shows that exposure to violence is high across the region, as 15% of people report being assaulted, while 13% report witnessing a violent attack or shooting. Jamaica, Trinidad & Tobago, and the Bahamas, have homicide rates among the highest in the region[103]. These countries have experienced homicide rates comparable to rates of violent deaths in nations experiencing armed conflict, with figures often exceeding 30 murders per 100,000 inhabitants[103].

The high levels of violent crime in the Caribbean have prompted various responses. Legislative measures include anti-gang laws and stricter gun control, such as Jamaica's

[102] IMF. (2017). Crime and Youth Unemployment in the Caribbean; and, Reddock, R. (2021). Welcome to Paradise: Neoliberalism, Violence and the Social and Gender Crisis in the Caribbean.
[103] InSight. (2023). Caribbean Has Violence Problem, Not Crime Problem: Report.

Firearms Act[104] and Trinidad and Tobago's Anti-Gang Act[105]. Policies like community policing and youth empowerment programs, such as Jamaica's Citizen Security and Justice Programme[106], aim to build trust and provide opportunities for at-risk youth. Social interventions, such as the Peace Management Initiative[107], and anonymous crime reporting programs are set up to enhance community safety. International cooperation through conventions like the UN Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime[108], and initiatives such as CariSECURE[109], emphasize collaborative whole-of-society efforts in tackling violent crime in the Caribbean. Importantly, CARICOM declared in 2023 that it will take a public health approach to crime and violence, rather than just a security angle[110].

Violence in the English-speaking Caribbean exacts significant economic and social costs on individuals and communities. According to the UNDP Caribbean Human Development Report[111], violence has significant social costs. High levels of violence undermine personal security, social cohesion and trust within communities[111]. Fear of crime can lead to social isolation, decreased community participation, and erosion of social capital[111]. For individuals, exposure to violence has detrimental effects on mental health, contributing to higher rates of anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) with children and adolescents being particularly vulnerable to these effects[111,112].

Furthermore, all English-speaking Caribbean nations have expressed their commitment to implementing the UN's Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by integrating the SDGs into their national planning[113]. SDG 16 explicitly refers to reducing all forms of violent crime and associated death rates[114]. Given all this, it is evident that addressing the drivers and root causes of violence is a top priority for the Caribbean.

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104 Government of Jamaica. (2022). The Firearms Act.
105 Ramcharitar, R. (2012, September 9). Anti-Gang Act aims to reduce crime. Trinidad Guardian.
106 Jamaica Information Service. (n.d.). Citizen Security and Justice Programme (CSJP).
107 Peace Management Initiative Western.
108 UNODC. (2024). Status of ratification of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto
109 UNDP. (n.d.). CariSECURE.
110 CARICOM. (2023). Declaration by heads of government on crime and violence as a public health issue.
111 UNDP. (2016, August 29). Caribbean Human Development Report. United Nations Development Programme.
112 Kerrigan, D. (2018). Language-in-Use Living under Militarisation and Insecurity: How Securitisation Discourse Wounds Trinidad. The Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Anthropology, 23(3), 416-436.
113 ECLAC. (2023, April 25). *Countries call for revitalizing the commitment to the 2030 Agenda and fostering renewed and bold policies*. United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean.
114 United Nations. (n.d.). *Goal 16: Promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies*. United Nations Sustainable Development Goals.

Understanding Violent Attitudes

The existence of violence in a community creates a cycle of violence where both direct and indirect exposure to violence perpetuates further violent crime[115]. Taking a social learning theory perspective, exposure to violence can normalize aggressive behaviour and make it seem acceptable or even desirable as individuals learn behaviours from their environments through observation and imitation[116]. The SCORE understands the normalisation or adoption of violent attitudes as a civic behaviour, and conceptualises constructive civic behaviour to require the rejection of violence in interpersonal, social, civic and political situations. For a cohesive and healthy society, citizens must not only be active and engaged, but they also must enshrine peaceful and non-violent attitudes.

Hence, to investigate the phenomenon of civic behaviour, the SCORE uses three key indicators which make up individual violent attitudes: **Aggression**, which measures the intensity of anger and aggression in one's personal interactions; **Tendency towards Violence**, which measures the readiness to use violence to resolve social interactions; and **Political Violence**, which measures one's comfort in using violence to achieve political goals. The aggregation of these three indicators gives a holistic metric of individual violent attitudes. High scores would imply that an individual (or, by extension, a community or society) is highly ready to use violence and that any social interaction is fragile to erupting into conflict or violence. Conversely, low scores imply resilient peacefulness.

Further, to discern ways in which effective and efficient policies can be designed to break the cycle of violence in the Caribbean, we analyse and uncover the drivers which might increase or decrease the tendency of individuals towards using violence. By investigating root causes typically associated with traditional security-related factors as well as other social, family, and mental health-related factors, we offer a multi-systemic strategy to address violence, which includes but goes beyond the securitisation perspective.

We find that community insecurity, and the presence of guns, gangs, drugs, and fights, should be addressed, but their decrease is not expected to dramatically reduce violent tendencies among citizens. In fact, working on the underlying economic, psychological, and family factors which are drivers of such attitudes and behaviours may prove more effective. Entry-points discovered include Positive Feelings towards Outgroups, Gender Equality Mindset, Depression, Anxiety, Economic Security, and Exposure to Domestic Violence

Levels of Violent Attitudes

Levels of Tendency Towards Violence

Tendency towards violence was measured by presenting respondents with various social scenarios and asking them to consider to what extent they thought it was acceptable to respond with violence. These scenarios involved: family disagreements, local authorities

[115] Hickling, F. W., Matthies, B. K., Morgan, K., & Gibson, R. C. (Eds.). (2012). *Perspectives in Caribbean psychology*. Jessica Kingsley Publishers.
[116] Bandura, A. (1977). *Social Learning Theory*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

making a decision you disagreed with, and someone disrespecting a group you belonged to. In all three cases, 8 to 9% of respondents thought it was somewhat or absolutely acceptable to respond with violence, while between 74 and 75% thought it was absolutely unacceptable. This implies that a strong majority of citizens do not consider it appropriate at all to use violence in tense social situations, however, there is a small minority of nearly one in ten people, who consider violence as a viable option. In smaller communities or less populous countries, even a small minority might be disproportionately disruptive.

At the country level, this picture is reflected in the low scores in the indicator in all countries, with no country scoring more than 1.5 out of 10, as shown in Figure 46. Openness to using violence in social situations is reported to be low in St Lucia and Trinidad and Tobago.



Figure 46: Heatmap of the mean scores of the indicator Tendency towards Violence, on a scale from 0 to 10. This indicator measures how appropriate respondents feel it is to use violence to resolve various interpersonal and social situations. Scores are generally low, but do show a variation across countries. There are no significant gender differences.

Levels of Aggression

Aggression has also been conceptualised as an aspect of mental health[117], and high scores of aggression can indicate underlying stressors at the individual, family, or community level[118]. In the SCORE, we consider this indicator to be the bridge between one's internal mental state and one's interpersonal interactions. Just over 7% of individuals mentioned

[117] Allen, J. J., Anderson, C. A., Bushman, B. J. (2018). *The General Aggression Model*. Current Opinion in Psychology, vol. 19.
[118] Anwar, F., Fry, D. P., Grigaitytė, I. (2018). *Aggression prevention and reduction in diverse cultures and contexts*. Current Opinion in Psychology, vol 19.

that they often or very often had trouble containing their anger, while another 35% sometimes have trouble containing it. Nearly 4% have threatened people they know often or very often, and another 22% do so sometimes. All this means that there is a small minority with significant recurring anger and aggression issues, and a slightly larger cohort where aggression appears sometimes, under certain circumstances. This indicates that indeed there is some fragility, as some people are ready to erupt into aggression, and potentially, violence. Compared to the regional average of 1.6 out of 10, scores are slightly higher in Saint Lucia (2.0) and Dominica (2.2), and slightly lower in Trinidad and Tobago (0.9) and the Bahamas (1.0). Scores are shown in Table 20 below.

Levels of Readiness for Political Violence

To measure Political Violence, individuals were asked to position themselves on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 corresponded to the statement *"Use of violence makes social division worse and does not solve any problems"* and 10 corresponded to the statement *"Use of violence is justified to achieve political goals"*. In Figure 47 we note that most countries have rather low scores in this indicator, with the notable outlier of Dominica, with a score of 3.0. This implies a higher readiness to use political violence in Dominica than any other surveyed country. There is also a slight gender difference, with men in Dominica scoring somewhat higher in this indicator than women. This may be due to the political dynamics in Dominica, where lack of leadership change may lead to a stronger desire for change and potentially a desperation with other forms of engagement which are more constructive.

Across the region, 65% of our sample responded 0 or 1 to this indicator, implying a total rejection of use of violence in politics. A further 25% responded 2 to 5, which indicates a lukewarm attitude to political violence, and probably is not cause for concern. However, 10% of the sample scores 6 to 10, which means they do have support for the use of violence to achieve political goals. Some of the legacies of the political violence that was present in the Caribbean in previous decades may still remain, or political violence could have been normalised. Although small, such a minority of political violent citizens could be disruptive to social cohesion, or could react violently to societal stressors, or if their political desires are strongly frustrated.



Figure 47: Heatmap of mean scores for Political Violence on a scale from 0 to 10. This indicator measures respondents support for violence to achieve political goals. Levels are generally low, but in some countries, such as Dominica and Jamaica, the score is slightly higher, implying there is a minority of individuals who think political violence is justified and useful.

Levels of Individual Violent Attitudes

Table 20 shows the scores of all countries, and the full sample score, for the three indicators, but also for the aggregated overall indicator Individual Violent Attitudes. Scores are high in Dominica and Jamaica, moderate in Belize, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. Scores are very low in the Bahamas and Trinidad and Tobago. As such, interventions to limit violent attitudes should be focussed in Dominica and Jamaica, and they should target Aggression and Political Violence, which score slightly higher than Tendency towards Violence.

Aggression and Tendency towards violence are correlated moderately strongly (0.43**), while Political Violence is moderately correlated with the other two scales (in both cases 0.27**). This means that these three indicators are closely related, and could be considered an overall phenomenon of Individual Violent Attitudes.

	Full Sample	Bahamas	Belize	Dominica	Jamaica	St. Lucia	SVG	T&T
Tendency towards Violence	**1.1**	0.9	0.9	1.2	1.5	0.6	1.2	0.5
Aggression	**1.6**	1.0	1.4	2.2	1.9	2.0	1.8	0.9
Political Violence	**1.7**	0.7	1.5	3.0	2.1	1.3	1.7	1.4
Individual Violent Attitudes	**1.5**	**0.9**	**1.3**	**2.1**	**1.8**	**1.3**	**1.6**	**0.9**

Table 20: Average country scores for the three indicators that make up Individual Violent Attitudes indicator, which are Tendency towards Violence, Aggression and Political Violence. Scores are generally low, but even a small score may imply a worrying violent attitude among a minority of respondents. Scores vary strongly from country to country.

Furthermore, analyses to test if particular demographic or social groups exhibited higher scores in these indicators revealed that among youth (aged 18 to 30) levels of Aggression and Tendency towards Violence are slightly higher than older people, but that is not true for Political Violence. This may be because younger people tend to be slightly more aggressive and impulsive than older people globally. Poorer people tend to have higher scores in all three indicators, implying that the strain of economic exclusion or disruption of livelihoods can turn someone towards adopting violent attitudes. In these indicators there were no differences across gender, urbanity, disability status, education level, employment status, or religion. In all cases, country variations remained the most significant.

For all three indicators, it's worth noting that the scores are relatively low in absolute terms. This indeed implies that levels of violent attitudes among citizens in the region are low. It is natural and expected that most citizens in most societies do not express any such tendencies, and strongly condemn the use of violence, as also found through other social cohesion assessments that the UN has commissioned. However, all that is needed to seriously threaten social harmony and community security is a significant minority which holds moderate levels of violent attitudes. It is for such individuals, which may make up only 5 or 10% of the population, where interventions might be needed to support them to maintain their peacefulness, by addressing the underlying causes which lead them to consider violent attitudes as useful.

It is with this frame that an analysis was carried out to identify pathways which lead individuals to normalise violent attitudes. Revealing the challenges which lead to violence, and the individual attitudes or community factors which can mitigate violent attitudes, is useful evidence to inform policies and programmes aiming to take a holistic response to violence levels in the Caribbean. It is understood that the response to violent acts, when they are committed, must also include a proportionate response from the justice system. The analysis discussed in this chapter, however, can help inform prevention policies by targeting the underlying fragilities which may generate violence in communities. Thus, recourse to the security and justice system, which is often more expensive, may be minimised (at least in part) by preventing violence. Such prevention strategies would be in line with the UN's New

Agenda for Peace, which highlights the importance of prevention of violence, for sustainable peace.

What drives or inhibits Individual Violent Attitudes?



Figure 48: Linear regression showing the predictors of individual violent attiudes. Factors predicting lower violent attidues shown on left, in red, while factors increasing violent attitudes are shown on the right, in blue. Factors ranked from top to bottom by strength of the predictive pathway (standardised beta coefficient). Weaker factors (β < 0.08) shown in a lighter shade, while stronger factors (β > 0.1) are bolded. Model controlled for gender, country, age. Outcome was square-rooted to ensure normality. Standardised R^2 = 0.301.

Figure 48 shows the analysis which tested hypotheses about the potential predictors or root causes of violent attitudes. It revealed a set of factors which tend to increase violent attitudes (in blue) as well as another set of factors which predict lower values of violent attitudes (in red). This analysis can be used to inform interventions or programmes which seek to leverage new ways of addressing violence and achieving violence reduction using a multi-dimensional approach which takes into account underlying dynamics. In particular, being aware of the factors which generate or mitigate violence allows for the development of prevention strategies against all forms of violence.

Social Attitudes

The strongest predictors are certain cohesive attitudes which seem to mitigate violent attitudes. These are **Positive Feelings to Outgroups** and **Gender Equality Mindset** (both β=-0.15). Those who hold cohesive attitudes towards social outgroups (people of a different race, religion, class, political orientation, etc) and those who support gender equality more tend to also have lower levels of violent attitudes. Clearly, there is a connection between certain cohesive attitudes and violent attitudes which merits integrating into violence prevention programmes. Positive Feelings are discussed in more detail in Chapter 1 on Inclusive Communities, while Gender Equality Mindset is investigated in Chapter 3, which discusses how to increase it among men and women. These findings strongly suggest that interventions working on one of these three outcomes will tend to have an effect on the others and could integrate aspects of one programme into the work of the other.

Violence in the home and the community

Interestingly, factors associated with community violence such as **Exposure to Violence** in the community and the **Presence of Gangs or Weapons**, are less important in predicting violent attitudes compared to violence within the family at present, like **Exposure to Domestic Violence**, or in the past, like having a **Safe and Peaceful Childhood**[119]. There is still of course a strong and important role to be played by working on the reduction of gangs, guns, and other enablers of violence, but violent attitudes in individuals seem to emerge most strongly when there are stressors in the family and household. Violence in such private, intimate spaces clearly are very destructive, traumatic, and can strongly influence one's comfort in using violence, and one's normalisation of it.

Further, the pathways from violence exposure, both community and domestic, to individual violent attitudes, constitute strong evidence of the existence of a cycle of violence in Caribbean communities. Those who experience violence then go on to normalise it, become more aggressive, and justify its use in interpersonal, social and political situations, and are thus more likely to be violent towards others, reproducing the cycle. Domestic violence and abuse in Caribbean communities and homes, and the way these are tied to structures of patriarchy, gender norms and use of violence, have been extensively discussed as drivers of violent attitudes amongst young people[120,121,122]. Breaking this cycle involves deploying evidence-based strategies to target the root causes of violence, as shown in this model.

Exposure to violence varies across the region and between demographic groups. Men tend to be slightly more exposed to community violence (fights, mugging, witnessing shootings, etc) than women in most countries. Exposure to violence in the community is more common in Jamaica, Saint Lucia and Dominica, as seen in Table 26 of chapter 3. Furthermore, rates of domestic violence are high across the region. As shown in Table 25 of Chapter 3, across our sample, 23% of men and 27% of women have experienced physical or sexual domestic violence at least once. This goes up to 30% of men and 34% of women in Jamaica, but is slightly lower in Belize and the Bahamas. Emotional, psychological and economic violence is also not uncommon, with about one in three people in the region having experienced it at least once. Overall, Jamaica, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Dominica report the highest prevalences. This implies that a tailoring of violence reduction initiatives to these countries must include an understanding of the rather strong prevalence of violence in these countries.

[119] The indicator Safe and Peaceful Childhood asks respondents to think about their households when they were children, and asks if they felt they had people taking care of them, the environment was loving and supporting, and devoid of violence.

[120] Ali, T. (2024). School Violence in Trinidad and Tobago: Courting the Unpopular Opinion – The Perpetrator as Victim. Caribbean Quarterly, 70(2), 222–240. https://doi.org/10.1080/00086495.2024.2366607

[121] Morgan, Paula. The Child as Progenitor: Trauma and the (Un) making of Self. Tout Moun Caribbean Journal of Cultural Studies 1, no. 1 (2011): 28-44.

[122] Reddock, R., Reid, S. D., & Nickenig, T. (2022). Child Sexual Abuse and the Complexities of Gender, Power, and Sexuality. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 37(1-2), NP176-NP208. https://doi.org/10.1177/0886260520909193

The SCORE measured the prevalence of certain negative community dynamics, such as the **proliferation of arms, drugs, and frequency of fights and presence of gangs**. Figure 49 shows the percentage of respondents who said that such phenomena appear at least sometimes, often or always in their community, as well as data on the frequency of police presence[123]. The figure shows that some countries, for example the smaller eastern Caribbean islands, and urban areas in general across the region, have a higher level of prevalence of gangs and weapons, which positively predict violent attitudes.



	St. Lucia	Dominica	Urban Areas	SVG	Jamaica	Full Sample	Belize	Rural Areas	T&T	Bahamas
Fights or loud arguments	55%	60%	49%	61%	51%	44%	42%	40%	33%	27%
Access to weapons	39%	38%	30%	35%	31%	26%	23%	21%	15%	19%
Sale of drugs	45%	59%	37%	32%	33%	32%	37%	26%	27%	23%
Gang presence	37%	17%	37%	23%	33%	26%	25%	16%	16%	17%
Police presence	61%	54%	80%	54%	73%	74%	86%	67%	74%	85%

Figure 49: Percentage of respondents reporting that they are aware of fights, weapons access, drug selling, gangs and police being sometimes, often, or always present in their community. Results shown for the full regional sample, each of the seven sampled countries, and in urban and rural areas across the region overall. The first four phenomena, considered negative phenomena, are more common in St. Lucia, Dominica and urban areas overall. The negative phenomena are reported less frequently in the Bahamas, Trinidad and Tobago, and in rural areas overall. Police presence also varies markedly across the countries.

It is interesting, and perhaps unexpected, that among the various positive and negative community phenomena that the SCORE measured, only gangs and weapons had a link to generating violent tendencies, and even that was a rather weak effect. The prevalence of drugs or fights does not seem to predict higher levels of violent tendencies at all. Nor does the more frequent presence of the police, or of local leaders, even though they might have been expected to reduce violent tendencies. All these factors are independent of individual

[123] It should be noted that about one in five respondents in some countries responded that they did not know, or they skipped this question. This is a much higher prevalence of non-response compared to other questions which may be less controversial or beyond the awareness of respondents. As such, there is a larger level of uncertainty in this data than other indicators. Still, the authors judge there is a value in considering this data as an indication of the intensity of certain phenomena.

violent attitudes, and the SCORE finds no evidence of local leaders, or the police force as an entry point to affect levels of violent attitudes either way[124].

Economic factors

SCORE has discovered that individuals reporting they feel marginalised due to their low-income report much higher prevalence of such symptoms, achieving a score of 4.2 compared to 2.5 as seen in the non-marginalised sample. Such a difference should inform targeting of mental health services to economically marginalised groups, considering barriers to such services, as well as the structural stressors they face, which may lead to normalisation of violence.

Economic Security helps to mitigate violence. Clearly, economic insecurity is a stressor which generates frustrations and grievances and opens the door to violent attitudes. Programmes which generate opportunities for sustainable livelihoods can thus be expected to reduce violent attitudes among the participants.

Mental wellbeing and harmony within the family

Mental health plays a very important role in shaping attitudes to and normalisation of violence. **Depression and Anxiety** is the strongest positive predictor of Individual Violent Attitudes that was discovered (β=0.11), suggesting that violence prevention strategies need to have a mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) aspect to them. The map in Figure 50 shows scores of Depression and Anxiety across the region, revealing a strong variation between countries. Mental health is a significant issue in Dominica, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Jamaica, but also an issue across the sub-region, which should be prioritised in any intervention that wants to reduce violent tendencies. Stigma around mental health and requesting mental health support may also be an issue in the Caribbean[125].

[124] It should be kept in mind that the outcome in question is violent *attitudes*, not the actual frequency of violent acts committed, which may well have a relationship to the frequency or quality of police presence in a community. The SCORE, being a social survey on perceptions, attitudes and behaviours, cannot measure individuals' perpetration of violent acts or crimes.

[125] SCORE data indicates that social tolerance towards people living with mental disabilities is lower than many other marginalised groups, including people with physical disabilities (see table 7 in chapter 1). This may imply a sigma towards mental health issues, reporting them, or requesting mental health services.



Figure 50: Heatmap of mean scores for the indicator Depression and Anxiety on a scale from 0 to 10. In some countries, the average score is slightly higher, implying that there is a higher prevalence of certain markers of mental wellbeing challenges.

The **Safe and Peaceful Childhood** indicator was measured by asking people about their childhood household experiences. The indicator included questions asking if respondents felt their needs were taken care of, they didn't experience physical violence, and they felt home was a safe and peaceful environment. Having a Safe and Peaceful Childhood was found to be a crucial mitigator of violent tendencies in adulthood, more important than community insecurity. Although the levels of this indicator, overall, is high, in some countries, and among some groups, it is significantly lower, on average. In particular, we see slightly lower scores in Dominica and Jamaica, as shown in the heatmap in Figure 51. Furthermore, individuals who are less educated or poorer, report having a less safe and peaceful childhood, as do those who report feeling marginalised due to their low income. Groups who are underprivileged in this way, tend to not have a safe or supportive family household, and so interventions and policies should seek to provide supportive and safe spaces in other contexts, such as schools or community spaces, particularly for poorer children, teenagers, and young adults, as this will mitigate against this effect, to some extent. Such a strategy would be a long-term preventative strategy, as it would be focussing on minimising violent attitudes in the next generation of young citizens.



Figure 51: Heatmap of mean scores for the indicator Safe and Peaceful Childhood on a scale from 0 to 10. The results are generally high, as expected, however there is a marked regional variation between countries. This indicator measured the extent to which individuals rate the level of safety, support and lack of violence in their childhood family environment.

To measure safe and peaceful childhood, we asked people to think of their household during their childhood, and give a score from 0 to 10, where 0 means they never experienced physical violence, and 10 that it was experienced regularly. Across our regional sample, 32% of respondents gave a score of 5 or above, implying that physical violence was at least a somewhat common experience in the household. This number varies quite a lot across the countries we sampled, from 16% in the Bahamas to 43% in Jamaica. Across the region as a whole, the maximum score of 10 was reported by 6%, which is a minority, but not a negligible number. This signifies that there is a subgroup of people who may feel traumatised, given the amount of childhood physical violence they reported. In Dominica and Jamaica this proportion is 9% while in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines it is 12%.

All these findings which link domestic violence, safe and peaceful childhood, and mental health to violent tendencies motivate adopting a family-centric mental-wellbeing-informed strategy for mitigating violent tendencies. Interventions may want to focus on ensuring family harmony and avoidance of domestic tensions and violence as a key entry point. A comprehensive strategy would consider various stages of the development of children, adolescents and young adults, and support them according to the particular challenges each age-group faces. Such interventions should also be specifically targeted towards individuals which are also excluded from economic and educational opportunities, who face simultaneous barriers to education and economic growth, while also not having had the privilege of a supportive family environment. Family harmony and mental wellbeing

interventions may also prioritise countries such as Dominica and Jamaica, which have been found to be scoring lower on relevant indicators. Taken together, all these interventions constitute a robust prevention strategy for violence. By focussing on the root causes and on prevention, a much more efficient, cost-effective, and long-lasting impact can be achieved, rather than responding to violence after it has emerged.

The findings suggest that factors relevant for the mitigation of violent tendencies are closely linked to other key dimensions of social cohesion. Family dynamics have been revealed to be a predictor of violent attitudes, while also Family Cohesion is a strong predictor of other positive civic outcomes like Community Cooperation and Civic Engagement (see the discussion of table 27 in Chapter 2, Section 1). Positive family environments decrease negative forms of participation and increase positive forms of participation. Overall, the model generates robust evidence that a successful strategy to prevent violence and reduce violent attitudes should contain components on five key dimensions: mental wellbeing, family harmony, livelihoods, community security, and cohesive attitudes. All the drivers, except positive feelings towards outgroups and gender equality outgroups, as well as the outcome variables, show a variation across countries which is significantly different. This implies that strategies should be strongly tailored per country, with each country strategy informed also by how well or poorly that country is doing on the drivers of interest.

Entry-points to reduce violent attitudes among specific target groups

Although the model in Figure 48 can be applied to produce a policy or programme for reducing violent attitudes in the population at large, it is also useful to consider specific groups that might need a more tailored strategy. For example, people who are older tend to have lower levels of violent attitudes, while those who are younger tend to have higher violent attitudes. This motivates focussing strategies on younger people, and possibly linking generations such that older people can serve as role-models against violence, at least to the extent that they have influence on younger people.

Furthermore, the SCORE reveals that specific demographic or socio-economic groups have different levels of the key drivers that have been identified as entry-points for reducing violent attitudes. These identified groups have specific profiles of some of the key drivers, and thus more general strategies for reducing violence may want to prioritise some of the drivers. These results are shown in Table 21 below. For example, people who are living in poverty tend to have worse scores in four of the crucial entry-points. They tend to have lower scores in the indicators Safe and Peaceful Childhood and Positive Feelings to Outgroups, while they have higher scores in Depression and Anxiety, and Exposure to Violence. As such, when targeting poorer individuals, considering these in more detail may be needed. Those living in rural areas also tend to face challenges on three indicators which are drivers of Individual Violent Attitudes. A preventative strategy for violence for those in rural areas might include providing accessible mental health services to address the higher scores in Depression and Anxiety, through mobile mental health support centres, which could rove between remote communities, bringing much needed services to those with limited access.

SCORE indicator	Potential entry points	People living in poverty	People with lower levels of education	Rural areas	Capital	Men
Safe and Peaceful Childhood	Child protection and domestic violence prevention programmes	●	●	●		
Depression and Anxiety	Mobile mental health support centres	●		●		
Gender Equality Mindset	Gender equality awareness campaigns		●			●
Positive Feelings to Outgroups	Initatives to facilitate dialogue among members of different groups	●		●		
Exposure to Violence	Violence prevention programmes	●			●	

Table 21: Potential entry points to reduce Individual Violent Attitudes among selected key demographic and socio-economic groups. Groups tend to score worse in each driver with a green pellet, and thus that driver might be an area of prioritisation, for that group

Recommendations

The SCORE analyses suggest that a holistic people-centric approach to reducing Individual Violent Attitudes could be very effective. Such an approach should be sensitive to structural barriers, economic marginalisation, family challenges (both past and present) and mental wellbeing.

Because levels of violent attitudes are generally low in the population as a whole, strategies should be targeted, to avoid preaching to the choir. Interventions targeting the population at large might be less effective given that most people have low scores and should be targeted to individuals or communities where challenges are identified and violence is normalised. Ensuring that these interventions have components which successfully attract younger participants, who are found to be slightly more aggressive than older citizens, could help focus interventions where they are needed. In general, close attention to the selection of participants is needed for such activities. Participants from certain socio-demographic groups also tend to exhibit particular fragilities, and interventions can be tailored to address them, as shown in Table 21.

Guns, gangs, drugs, and fights should of course be addressed and reduced. However, citizens who experience the proliferation of such challenges in their community are not any more likely to hold violent attitudes than those who do not. As such, although such phenomena should be decreased, their decrease is not expected to change attitudes towards violence. Instead, attitudes can only be changed by focussing on the root causes of how those attitudes arose, rather than how they might be instrumentalised once violence has already be normalised.

Those root causes include mental wellbeing and family harmony. Interventions which build family connectedness, address childhood trauma, and ensure mental health could be very effective in mitigating violent tendencies. Screenings of the prevalence of specific mental health or family challenges should be deployed in communities where violence reduction interventions are planned, to select participants, which should then undergo a deeper assessment of potential mental health and family issues. Best practises deployed in

violence-affected communities include establishing multi-family healing groups, to reestablish supportive networks and ensure sustainable impact, while also building community ties. Further, programmes addressing the stigmatisation of mental health and the access to mental health services could also be transformative.

And, a final root cause generating violent attitudes is economic insecurity. Violent attitudes become more attractive to those who face economic strain. So, interventions around violence should always include viable alternatives for creating sustainable livelihoods and economic opportunities. Given the high levels of community solidarity and cooperation in the Caribbean, investigating opportunities for community enterprises in target communities might be a good first step. Once fertile ground is identified, supporting communities to collaboratively set up such enterprises, through re-skilling, entrepreneurship trainings or small-grant programmes, might be very effective, if combined with adequate MHPSS services.

Chapter 3. Gender Equality and Diversity: Bridging Social and Generational Divides

Across the sub-region, gender equality is a core principle which development work strives towards. The present chapter assesses levels of Support for Gender Equality and Diversity, understanding what areas and among which demographic groups there is the most need for a change in attitudes, as well as identifying particular contentious topics, such as LGBTQ rights and acceptance of people living with HIV where awareness should be raised. Furthermore, by identifying and profiling sceptics and supporters of Gender Equality and Diversity, we discovered potential signals of how to achieve this both among men and women, separately. Since gendered violence is high in the sub-region, gender differences in experiences of violence are also investigated. This can inform tailored programmes to tackle violence. Finally, to investigate if young men and young women agree on key attitudes and preferences, we present findings on their different views on certain issues, discovering a growing divergence of opinion between young men and women.

Gender Equality as a Horizontal Glue

SCORE findings demonstrate that despite the high levels of Support for Gender Equality Policies, people from the Caribbean, especially men, tend to normalise different gender stereotypes on the role of men as the economic providers and decision-makers of the household, as well as domestic violence, and sexual harassment. Identities and rights (legalisation of same-sexual activity and anti-discrimination laws) of LGBTQ people are still stigmatised. However, gender stereotypes “dilute the social glue”, breaking down social bonds and limits forms of cooperation between people and across the genders. The SCORE tells us that a profile of Sceptics and Supporters of Gender Equality and Diversity indicators suggests that the factors that affect men and women are different. The attitudes of men are related to tolerance towards LGBTQ and people living with HIV, perceptions on governance, and Aggression, while those of women are linked with age, different types of marginalisation, attitudes towards people from other religions, and individual violent attitudes. These findings motivate the Differences between young men and young women

SCORE data shows that the gender gap among younger generations has been widening when it comes to gender related indicators. While women aged 60 and above report higher levels of Gender Equality and Diversity than men (6.1 for women and 5.6 for men), the gap has been progressively increasing with higher levels in women but lower in men. Young women aged 18 to 29, score 6.7, significantly higher than young men aged 18 to 29, scoring 5.4. This indicates that in the same period, women have been becoming more progressive than other women, however men have been becoming less progressive than other men. This tendency is consistent to different extents in the three indicators that measure Gender Equality and Diversity.



Figure 65. Gender Equality and Diversity means in men and women of different age groups.

Young women report a slight increase in the Support for Gender Equality Policies indicator compared to their older counterparts, from 8.2 in women aged 60 and above to 8.5 in women aged 18 to 29, and young men report a slightly decrease in the same indicator compared to their younger counterparts, from 5.6 in men aged 60 and above to 5.4 in men aged 18 to 29. This means that while women have become slightly more supportive of Gender Equality Policies, and men slightly less supportive, the levels of support for each gender have been consistent across time.



Figure 66. Support for Gender Equality Policies means in men and women of different age groups.

In the case of Support for Gender Stereotypes, men show a slightly increase in younger generations, from 4.3 in men aged 60 and above to 4.6 in men aged 18 to 29; however, women have experienced a bigger decrease in the same indicator going from 3.7 in women aged 60 and above to 3.1 in men aged 18 to 29. This indicates that while men have been slightly more supportive of Gender Stereotypes, women have become less and less supportive of stereotypes across time, indicating a more progressive mindset across women.



Figure 67. Gender Stereotypes means in men and women of different age groups.

Data shows that younger generations have developed oppositive views in terms of how much interest is placed on women's rights. Both men and women aged 60 and above report the same level of support for the statement "I believe too much interest is being placed on women's rights over the needs of men", a score of 5.1. However, the level of support for this idea has significantly increased in men, going up to 6.2, but decreased in women going down to 4.3. This indicates that younger generations of men tend to resent more the interest on women's rights, but at the same time younger generations of women do not believe that there is too much interest on women's rights at the expense of men's needs.



Figure 68. Believe Too Much Interest Placed on Womens Rights means in men and women of different age groups.

Perceptions on LGBTQ also show changes in younger groups of people. In the Positive Attitudes towards LGBTQ people indicator, women report an increase from 2.9 in women aged 60 and above to 4.0 in women aged 18 to 29. Nevertheless, men don't show any significant change, going from 2.7 in men aged 60 and above to 2.8 in men aged 18 to 29. This suggests that while women have become more progressive in terms of attitudes and policies regarding LGBTQ people, men have remained on the same level of support. However, this trend is different when it comes to Social Tolerance of LGBTQ. Women report becoming more accepting, from 4.9 in women aged 60 and above to 6.0 in women aged 18 to 29, on the contrary, men report becoming less accepting, from 4.1 in men aged 60 and above to 3.7 in men aged 18 to 29. This suggests that women have become more accepting towards LGBTQ people, consistent with the increase in positive attitudes towards them. However, despite that men have not report changes in Positive Attitudes towards LGBTQ People indicator, they do report a decrease in the levels of acceptance towards them.



Figure 69. Positive Attitudes towards LGBTQ people means in men and women of different age groups.



Figure 70. Social Tolerance towards LGBTQ people in men and women of different age groups.

There are also differences in young's people attitudes towards people living with HIV. In general, women report higher levels of Social Tolerance towards people living with HIV than men across different age groups, except for people aged 50 to 59, where women score 7.6, lower than men's 8.1. The trends show that both men and women improved their tolerance at different moments, however both groups have experienced a steady decline resulting in low values for both. In the case of men, there have been a decline from 8.1 in men aged 50 to 59, descending to 6.8 in young men aged 18 to 29. In the case of women, there was an improvement from 7.6 in women aged 50 to 59, going up to 8.2 in women aged 30 to 39; however, young women aged 18 to 29 report a decline with a 7.7 score. These findings show that there is a general decline in tolerance towards people living with HIV, with lower values in young men. While this decline has been consistent in men across groups of most ages, this is only reported in the youngest group of women.



Figure 71. Social Tolerance towards people living with HIV in men and women of different age groups.

Recommendations discussed below. They can inform the work of governments, international and civil society organisations which strive to build a more cohesive society through a more gender-sensitive populace, and should be integrated into national action plans, activist campaigns, or programmes and interventions.

Gender Equality Sub-Regional Challenges

Despite progress, women's political participation remains a concern among countries in the Caribbean[126], where women hold on average just 23% of the seats in parliaments of the subregion focussed on in this study[127], far from the SDG 5 target of 50%. Gender inequality persists in the workforce in the Caribbean, with women overrepresented in lower-waged occupations, unpaid labour and informal jobs[128]. Women in the Caribbean are also more likely to be unemployed[129], despite their higher educational achievement[130], and in six of the seven countries in the sample, the labour force participation rate of women is between 10% to 18% lower than that of men[131].

All seven countries in the sample have ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), and their national legislature includes protections for women and girls from gender-based violence[132]. In 2017, the rate of intimate femicides per 100,000 women was 3.7 in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 3.3 in Saint Lucia, 1.0 in Jamaica, 0.5 in Belize and 0.3 in Trinidad and Tobago[133], with the former two of these among the highest in the sample.

The effects of violence are gendered, impacting men and women differently. Violent crimes in the sub-region tend to be mostly urban and concentrated in lower-income communities, with young men considered to be most at risk of violent conflict and of becoming violent offenders[134]. Further, women are the main victims of male partner violence and male sexual violence, including rape, domestic abuse, and other forms of gender-based violence[135].

By 2024, despite moderately improving scores for SDG 5 in the seven countries, progress was assessed as insufficient to attain the goal of Gender Equality, with challenges

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[126] Commonwealth Secretariat. (2018). Women and Political Parties in Five Small States of the Commonwealth Caribbean.
[127] Sachs, J. D., Lafortune, G., & Fuller, G. (2024). Sustainable Development Report 2024. Paris: SDSN; Dublin: Dublin University Press. Data from: dashboards.sdgindex.org/map/goals/SDG5
[128] United Nations Caribbean. (2021). Caribbean Common Multi-Country Analysis (CMCA).
[129] UN Women. (2019). Status of Women and Men Report.
[130] United Nations Caribbean. (2021). Caribbean Common Multi-Country Analysis (CMCA).
[131] Data unavailable for Dominica. Labor force participation rate (% of population, 15 to 64). "ILO modelled estimates database" ILOSTAT. International Labour Organization. 2023.
[132] UN Women Caribbean. (n.d.). GBV Country Resources.
[133] CEPALSTAT. (2017). Women deaths at the hands of their intimate partner or former partner.
[134] Hosein, G., & Mohammed, A. (2021). Pathways to inclusive peacebuilding in the Caribbean. United Nations.
[135] Hosein, G., & Mohammed, A. (2021). Pathways to inclusive peacebuilding in the Caribbean. United Nations.

remaining across the board[136]. Gender stereotypes are prevalent across the Caribbean subregion, both in terms of masculinity and of the role of women to men[137]. These limit both women and men, demonstrating the need to positively develop and redefine social norms[138].

Furthermore, LGBTQ people in the Caribbean face barriers in their access to economic, social and cultural rights, including their access to healthcare, housing, employment, education and safety[139]. As of 2024, Jamaica, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines retain laws criminalising consensual same-sex sexual acts[140], while Dominica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Belize decriminalised such acts since 2016, and The Bahamas decriminalised these in 1991[141]. Despite differing levels of enforcement, these laws legitimise discrimination, hostility, violence, and stigma[142]. Public opinion lags behind legal progress[143].

In Jamaica in 2023, one in three LGBTQ people surveyed experienced threatening language in the six months prior, and 61% had faced discrimination over the last 12 months[144]. Just 12% of the general population in Jamaica in the same year approved of the right to marry for same-sex couples, as did 11% of people in The Bahamas, and 21% of people in Trinidad and Tobago[145]. In a 2018 study by Human Rights Watch, all interviewees had ever been harassed by family because they are – or were suspected to be – LGBTQ[146]. In Saint Vincent and the Grenadines in 2023, nearly all LGBTQ interviewees reported at least one recent incident of physical or verbal abuse, threats, sexual violent, or harassment[147].

Defining and measuring Gender Equality and Diversity

Support for Gender Equality and Diversity is a composite measure combining three key concepts: Support for Gender Equality Policies, Positive Attitudes towards LGBTQ People, and Opposition of Gender Stereotypes.

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[136] Sachs, J. D., Lafortune, G., & Fuller, G. (2024). Sustainable Development Report 2024. Paris: SDSN; Dublin: Dublin University Press. Data from: dashboards.sdgindex.org/map/goals/SDG5
[137] United Nations Caribbean. (2021). Caribbean Common Multi-Country Analysis (CMCA).
[138] United Nations Caribbean. (2021). Caribbean Common Multi-Country Analysis (CMCA).
[139] United Nations Caribbean. (2021). Caribbean Common Multi-Country Analysis (CMCA).
[140] ILGA World - The International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association. (2024). ILGA Database.
[141] In Dominica, consensual same-sex sexual acts have been legal since just 2024, in Trinidad and Tobago since 2018, in Belize since 2016, and in The Bahamas since 1991, according to the ILGA Database.
[142] Human Rights Watch. (2018). Discriminatory Laws against LGBT People in the Eastern Caribbean.
[143] Equaldex. (2024). LGBT Equality Index in Caribbean.
[144] UNDP & USAID (2023). National Survey for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Persons in Jamaica.
[145] Lupu, Noam, Mariana Rodríguez, Carole J. Wilson, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister (Eds.). (2023). Pulse of Democracy. Nashville, TN: LAPOP.
[146] Human Rights Watch. (2018). Discriminatory Laws against LGBT People in the Eastern Caribbean.
[147] Human Rights Watch. (2023). Violence and Discrimination against LGBT People in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.



Figure 52. Support for Gender Equality and Diversity meta-indicator, and its three sub indicators: 1) Support for Gender Equality Policies, Positive Attitudes towards LGBTQ People, and Gender Stereotypes.

Support for Gender Equality Policies

Support for Gender Equality Policies is generally high and the majority of men and women in all SCORE Caribbean countries support these policies, with 93% of the full sample agreeing that there should be laws protecting women from discrimination, and 89% supporting parental leave for men (Figure 53). Additionally, 86% believe that women should have equal access to jobs and pay, although a slightly lower proportion – 78% - agree that there should be more women in political positions. Support for women in politics is particularly lower in men than women, with 71% and 86% agreeing with such policies, respectively.

Although there are no significant differences in this indicator between countries, levels are slightly lower in Dominica, Jamaica and Saint Lucia. The lowest levels of support for equal pay are observed in Saint Lucia and Dominica, where 71% and 75% support this policy, respectively. In Dominica, respondents are also uncertain about women in leadership positions – supported by 65%.

Figure 53: Percentage of respondents who agree with the four statements of Support for Gender Equality Policies by gender.



Figure 54: Mean scores for Support for Gender Equality Policies, on a scale from 0 to 10.



Support for Gender Stereotypes

Respondents normalise the role of men as the economic providers of the household, and more than half (59%) of men think that they should have the final word on important decisions. Further, around one in two men (47%) agree that a husband can discipline his wife, and 40% that it is acceptable for men to catcall, whistle or grope women. Although lower, there is also a share of women who normalise these attitudes.

Support for Gender stereotypes are lower in The Bahamas[148] and Belize[149], and among women[150] and respondents with higher levels of education[151].

[148] ANOVA, $p < 0.01$, $F = 55$, Cohen's d effect size 0.50.
[149] ANOVA, $p < 0.01$, $F = 40$, Cohen's d effect size 0.46.
[150] ANOVA, $p < 0.01$, $F = 222$, Cohen's d effect size 0.54.
[151] ANOVA, $p < 0.01$, $F = 44$, Cohen's d effect size 0.58, 0.48.

Figure 55: Percentage of respondents who agree with the five statements of Support for Gender Stereotypes by gender.



Figure 56: Mean scores for Support for Gender Stereotypes, on a scale from 0 to 10. Higher numbers are undesirable, as they indicate a stronger belief in such stereotypes.



Positive Attitudes towards LGBTQ People

Except for respondents in Belize[152] and to a lesser extent Saint Lucia[153], Positive Attitudes towards LGBTQ People are low. Unlike other gender equality and diversity indicators, this is

[152] ANOVA, $p < 0.01$, $F = 224$, Cohen's d effect size 1.09.
[153] ANOVA, $p < 0.01$, $F = 37$, Cohen's d effect size 0.59.

not significantly different between men and women at the subregional level. The positive attitudes in Belize and Saint Lucia could be due to the existing more progressive legislation, such as the decriminalisation of same-sexual activity in Belize in 2016, and the Domestic Violence Act 2022 in Saint Lucia which provide legal protections to people in same-sex relationships who experience domestic violence, as well as being the only country in the region that prohibits same-sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination[154]. Also, SCORE data shows that both, people in Belize and Saint Lucia, hold a more tolerant attitudes towards people of marginalised groups in general[155].

Although 34% agree to an extent with laws protecting LGBTQ people from discrimination, 48% strongly disagree with this, and 71% of respondents strongly disagree that same-sex sexual activity should be legal (Figure 57). One third strongly agree with the statement "gay men are less men".

Figure 57: Percentage of responses for Positive Attitudes towards LGBTQ People.



[154] Thomspon, L. (2022). St. Lucia "Breaks The Bias" With New LGBTIQ-Inclusive Domestic Violence Act. Outright International.

[155] Social Tolerance Indicator: Full Sample mean 7.2, Belize mean: 8.2, and Saint Lucia mean: 8.0.

Figure 58: Mean scores for Positive Attitudes towards LGBTQ People, on a scale from 0 to 10.



Support for Gender Equality and Diversity

Discussing the composite measure of Support for Gender Equality and Diversity, we find that it is moderate across the sample, although significantly higher in women than men[156] (Figure 59), and among respondents with a higher level of education[157]. Support is higher in Belize and lower in Jamaica[158]. Men in Jamaica[159] and Dominica[160] report the lowest levels in this indicator.

[156] ANOVA, $p < 0.01$, $F = 385$, Cohen's d effect size 0.71
[157] ANOVA, $p < 0.01$, $F = 42$, Cohen's d effect sizes 0.58 and 0.44 compared to those with incomplete or complete secondary-level education
[158] ANOVA, $p < 0.01$, $F = 168$, Cohen's d effect sizes 0.94 between Belize and other countries, $F = 186$, Cohen's d 0.49 between Jamaica and other countries.
[159] ANOVA Jamaica, $p < 0.01$, $F = 121$, Cohen's d effect size between men and women 0.90.
[160] ANOVA Dominica, $p < 0.01$, $F = 52$, Cohen's d effect size between men and women 0.73.

Figure 59: Mean scores for Support for Gender Equality and Diversity, on a scale from 0 to 10.



How do we increase Support for Gender Equality and Diversity?

To help understand the characteristics of people who support or oppose gender equality, respondents were grouped into "Sceptics", "the Mainstream" or "Supporters" based on their level of Support for Gender Equality and Diversity (Figure 60):

Who are the Sceptics? They oppose gender equality and diversity, scoring between 0 and 5 on the indicator. This group makes up 26% of the sample, and represents a sizable minority that are sceptical about gender and LGBTQ rights, and generally reject gender equality policies.

Who are the Mainstream?: This is lukewarm support, but not passionate adherence to gender equality, scoring between 5 and 7, constituting 54%. This is the largest group, and it represents the most common way of thinking about gender equality in citizens of the sampled countries.

Who are Supporters? They strongly support questions about gender equality and diversity, scoring between 7 and 10 on the indicator, making up 20% of the sample.

There is a higher proportion of Supporters among women, and a higher proportion of Sceptics among men (Figure 61). These groups of men and women are profiled in the following chapters, to understand whether there are unique factors that distinguish men Supporters and Sceptics, compared to women Supporters and Sceptics.

Respondents in **Belize** are more likely to be Supporters of Gender Equality and Diversity – constituting 48% of the sample, compared to 9% who are Sceptics (Figure 62). Respondents

in **Jamaica** are slightly more likely to be Sceptics compared to the sample total, with 33% belonging to the Sceptics group (Figure 63). Figures are also slightly higher in **Dominica**, **Saint Lucia**, and **Saint Vincent and the Grenadines**. In The Bahamas and Trinidad and Tobago the share if Sceptics is lower, however, the share of supporters is very similar to the one in the full sample. In **Jamaica**, half of men are Sceptics, as are 42% of men in **Dominica**. There is a higher proportion of young men who are Sceptics.



Figure 60: Histogram of respondents based on their scores for Support for Gender Equality and Diversity, with proportion of Sceptics (orange), Mainstream (grey) and Supporters (blue) shown.



Figure 61: Proportion of respondents in groups based on Support for Gender Equality and Diversity by gender.



Figure 62: Proportion of respondents in groups based on Support for Gender Equality and Diversity by country.



Figure 63: Proportion of respondents in groups based on Support for Gender Equality and Diversity by country and gender.



Figure 64: Proportion of respondents in groups based on Support for Gender Equality and Diversity by age and gender.

Profile of Supporters and Sceptics

By detecting the unique differences between Supporters and Sceptics, it becomes possible to target sceptic men and women with the overall aim of making them more supportive of Gender Equality and Diversity, in distinct gender-specific ways.

Women Supporters and Sceptics: Women Supporters are younger overall, less reliant on income from relatives abroad, and experience fewer barriers due to colonial past compared to Women Sceptics (Table 22). Women supporters also have better intergroup relations with other religions. Women Supporters report lower tendencies towards violence and lower political violence. Altogether, this demonstrates that sceptic women face a specific profile of adversities and experiences. Sceptic women are older overall and prefer their religious ingroup, they can be approached through respected religious leaders.

Men Supporters and Sceptics: Men Supporters are more tolerant of people living with HIV compared to Sceptics. Men Supporters are more supportive of democratic values and are less aggressive. They perceive more progress in good governance and in the response to violence and crime. Sceptic men could be convinced by politicians who are respected for responding to crime, and can be approached through role models such as sports-people or younger social media influencers.

For both men and women actual experiences of violence, such as Exposure to Violence, Exposure to Domestic Violence, and Negative Community Dynamics[161], are not linked to views around gender equality.

[161] Which includes the presence of fights, drugs, gangs, and easy access to weapons in the community.

Table 22: Table of mean scores in other indicators, for each group based on Support for Gender Equality and Diversity by gender. Red highlight indicates statistically significantly lower score in the indicator, blue highlight indicates statistically significantly higher score in the indicator, based on ANOVA, $p < 0.01$ and Cohen's d effect size between the two groups larger than 0.4 (medium).

	Men Sceptics	**Men Supporters**	**Women Sceptics**	**Women Supporters**	Full Sample	F	Cohen's d between highlighted group
Age	40	42	46	38	43	14	0.47
Rely on Income from Relatives Abroad	2.5	1.7	3.8	2.0	2.6	15	0.58
Barriers due to Colonial Past	4.3	3.7	4.9	3.5	4.1	9	0.46
Social Proximity: Other Religions	8.8	9.3	8.4	9.2	8.9	12	0.52
Positive Feelings: Other Religions	8.5	8.8	8.0	8.9	8.6	7	0.44
Tendency towards Violence	1.5	1.1	1.7	0.7	1.1	17	0.53
Political Violence	2.0	1.6	2.2	1.2	1.7	8	0.42
Aggression	2.0	1.3	2.1	1.3	1.6	22	0.41
Progress in Good Governance	2.2	3.1	2.2	1.9	2.4	14	0.42
Progress in Responding to Violence & Crime	2.0	3.3	2.2	1.7	2.2	13	0.47
Social Tolerance towards LGBTQ People	3.0	6.3	4.7	6.8	4.7	63	0.87, 0.55
Social Tolerance towards People Living with HIV	6.2	8.6	7.2	8.3	7.6	39	0.64
Support for Democratic Values	5.1	6.4	5.1	5.7	5.6	9	0.44

What are the differences between men and women?

Life experiences in the Caribbean are impacted by gender, and when it comes to attitudinal indicators measured in the SCORE, the gap between men and women seems to be growing in younger generations. Findings show that, while young women are becoming more progressive in their views about gender equality and diversity, young men are becoming less progressive.

Gender and Community Cooperation and Marginalisation

There are slight differences in certain aspects of Community Cooperation. Women are more likely to engage in charitable activities or help neighbours with daily tasks, while men are involved in efforts to improve their neighbourhoods (Table 23).

Table 23: Percentage of respondents who have at least once participated in any form of Community Cooperation by gender.

There are no gender differences in the proportion who have ever felt discriminated against due to any aspects of their identity, with 23% of respondents reporting that this has happened. Of those who have ever felt discriminated against, women are slightly more likely than men to have felt marginalised at school or work (Table 24).

Table 24: Proportion of respondents who have ever felt discriminated against in various situations (only asked to those who have ever felt discriminated against).

	Full Sample	Men	Women
In public and recreational spaces	36%	35%	36%
In my school or my job	28%	23%	32%
By my neighbors	26%	29%	24%
In leisure and social situations	21%	25%	17%
When trying to access a public service	21%	24%	18%
Within my household	9%	9%	10%

Domestic Violence and Exposure to Violence

Both women and men are exposed to domestic violence, with 27% of women ever having experienced physical or sexual forms of domestic violence, alongside 23% of men. One in three (33%) women and 31% of men have ever experienced emotional, psychological or economic forms of domestic violence[162].

Although not higher in women overall, all forms of domestic violence against women are most prevalent in Jamaica, Dominica and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (Table 25).

[162] Data from UN Women also reports high levels of exposure to domestic violence, indicating that in Jamaica 39% of women have experience any form of intimate partner violence in their lifetime, and 44% in Trinidad and Tobago.

Exposure to emotional, psychological or economic violence is higher for women in Belize and Dominica, compared to men.

Community violence is more common in men, particularly those in Saint Lucia and Jamaica (Table 26). This is linked to higher levels of Depression and Anxiety[163], childhood adversities[164] and economic insecurity[165] in men. Almost one in five men have been robbed, 17% have personally witnessed someone being shot, wounded or violently attacked, and 17% have been physically assaulted themselves.

Table 25: Proportion of respondents who were ever exposed to different forms of domestic violence. Red font indicates figure is higher in women than men in specified country. Underlined font indicates it is higher in women in specified country compared to women elsewhere.

% "at least once" + "sometimes" + "often" experienced...	**physical or sexual violence**		**emotional, psychological or economic violence**	
	Men	**Women**	**Men**	**Women**
Jamaica	30%	34%	40%	42%
SVG	19%	26%	34%	36%
Dominica	21%	34%	35%	44%
St. Lucia	13%	21%	25%	30%
T&T	17%	19%	25%	23%
Belize	15%	19%	12%	22%
Bahamas	4%	17%	9%	14%
Full Sample	23%	27%	31%	33%

[163] Pearson correlation coefficient, $r = 0.221$, $p < 0.05$
[164] $r = 0.254$, $p < 0.05$
[165] $r = 0.242$, $p < 0.05$

Table 26: Percentage of respondents who were ever exposed to any form of community violence.

		Ever exposed to any form of community violence
Jamaica	Men	66%
	Women	58%
St. Lucia	Men	65%
	Women	50%
Dominica	Men	62%
	Women	65%
SVG	Men	61%
	Women	59%
Bahamas	Men	50%
	Women	44%
Belize	Men	42%
	Women	40%
T&T	Men	40%
	Women	41%
Full Sample	Men	56%
	Women	51%

Differences between young men and young women

SCORE data shows that the gender gap among younger generations has been widening when it comes to gender related indicators. While women aged 60 and above report higher levels of Gender Equality and Diversity than men (6.1 for women and 5.6 for men), the gap has been progressively increasing with higher levels in women but lower in men. Young women aged 18 to 29, score 6.7, significantly higher than young men aged 18 to 29, scoring 5.4. This indicates that in the same period, women have been becoming more progressive than other women, however men have been becoming less progressive than other men. This tendency is consistent to different extents in the three indicators that measure Gender Equality and Diversity.



Figure 65. Gender Equality and Diversity means in men and women of different age groups.

Young women report a slight increase in the Support for Gender Equality Policies indicator compared to their older counterparts, from 8.2 in women aged 60 and above to 8.5 in women aged 18 to 29, and young men report a slightly decrease in the same indicator compared to

their younger counterparts, from 5.6 in men aged 60 and above to 5.4 in men aged 18 to 29. This means that while women have become slightly more supportive of Gender Equality Policies, and men slightly less supportive, the levels of support for each gender have been consistent across time.



Figure 66. Support for Gender Equality Policies means in men and women of different age groups.

In the case of Support for Gender Stereotypes, men show a slightly increase in younger generations, from 4.3 in men aged 60 and above to 4.6 in men aged 18 to 29; however, women have experienced a bigger decrease in the same indicator going from 3.7 in women aged 60 and above to 3.1 in men aged 18 to 29. This indicates that while men have been slightly more supportive of Gender Stereotypes, women have become less and less supportive of stereotypes across time, indicating a more progressive mindset across women.



Figure 67. Gender Stereotypes means in men and women of different age groups.

Data shows that younger generations have developed oppositive views in terms of how much interest is placed on women's rights. Both men and women aged 60 and above report the same level of support for the statement "I believe too much interest is being placed on women's rights over the needs of men", a score of 5.1. However, the level of support for this idea has significantly increased in men, going up to 6.2, but decreased in women going down to 4.3. This indicates that younger generations of men tend to resent more the interest on women's rights, but at the same time younger generations of women do not believe that there is too much interest on women's rights at the expense of men's needs.



Figure 68. Believe Too Much Interest Placed on Womens Rights means in men and women of different age groups.

Perceptions on LGBTQ also show changes in younger groups of people. In the Positive Attitudes towards LGBTQ people indicator, women report an increase from 2.9 in women aged 60 and above to 4.0 in women aged 18 to 29. Nevertheless, men don't show any significant change, going from 2.7 in men aged 60 and above to 2.8 in men aged 18 to 29. This suggests that while women have become more progressive in terms of attitudes and policies regarding LGBTQ people, men have remained on the same level of support. However, this trend is different when it comes to Social Tolerance of LGBTQ. Women report becoming more accepting, from 4.9 in women aged 60 and above to 6.0 in women aged 18 to 29, on the contrary, men report becoming less accepting, from 4.1 in men aged 60 and above to 3.7 in men aged 18 to 29. This suggests that women have become more accepting towards LGBTQ people, consistent with the increase in positive attitudes towards them. However, despite that men have not report changes in Positive Attitudes towards LGBTQ People indicator, they do report a decrease in the levels of acceptance towards them.



Figure 69. Positive Attitudes towards LGBTQ people means in men and women of different age groups.



Figure 70. Social Tolerance towards LGBTQ people in men and women of different age groups.

There are also differences in young's people attitudes towards people living with HIV. In general, women report higher levels of Social Tolerance towards people living with HIV than men across different age groups, except for people aged 50 to 59, where women score 7.6, lower than men's 8.1. The trends show that both men and women improved their tolerance at different moments, however both groups have experienced a steady decline resulting in low values for both. In the case of men, there have been a decline from 8.1 in men aged 50 to 59, descending to 6.8 in young men aged 18 to 29. In the case of women, there was an improvement from 7.6 in women aged 50 to 59, going up to 8.2 in women aged 30 to 39; however, young women aged 18 to 29 report a decline with a 7.7 score. These findings show that there is a general decline in tolerance towards people living with HIV, with lower values in young men. While this decline has been consistent in men across groups of most ages, this is only reported in the youngest group of women.



Figure 71. Social Tolerance towards people living with HIV in men and women of different age groups.

Recommendations

Gender Equality and Diversity: Indicators that build Gender Equality and Diversity show mixed results, with overall high levels of Support for Gender Equality Policies, but also medium levels of Support for Gender Stereotypes, and low levels of Positive Attitudes towards LGBTQ People. This indicates that while there have been efforts to improve gender policies for women, there is still a generalised prevalence of negative social norms around gender roles. Despite the high levels of Support for Gender Equality Policies, support for women in political positions is lower, which can be described societally as giving women political influence while denying them political power.

Support for Gender Stereotypes: When it comes to Support for Gender Stereotypes, there is a normalisation of the role of men as economic providers and decision-makers, alongside normalisation of domestic violence and sexual harassment. This of course sits within a sub-regional context where women are graduating from secondary and tertiary education at higher levels than men and seeing their economic power grow faster than many men. While these attitudes are more prevalent in men, there is still a significant share of women who normalise them too. Although attitudes towards LGBTQ people are generally unfavourable, one third of the sample does support anti-discrimination laws. This suggests that while efforts have been made to improve gender equality policies, the social norms still normalise multiple forms of exclusion and violence. Programmes should focus on addressing these attitudes

Domestic Violence: Both women and men are subject to domestic violence, with it being higher for women. Domestic violence against women is prevalent across the sample, and highest in Dominica, Jamaica and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, while exposure to violence is common for men in St Lucia and Jamaica.

Sceptics: Support for Gender Equality and Diversity is higher in women, and sceptic attitudes are more prevalent in men, particularly young men, and men in Jamaica, Dominica, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. Awareness campaigns and strategies to increase support should consider these demographic findings focusing on men – particularly those aged 18 to 35, and those in Jamaica and the Eastern Caribbean. These can be paired with interventions to combat domestic violence and should highlight the benefits of gender equality not only for women but also for men, addressing common stereotypes.

Strategies for Men and Women: The factors that influence Support for Gender Equality and Diversity are different between women and men, indicating that while there must be a subregional strategy to increase the levels of support, different programmes should be tailored to the profiles of men and women in the subregion Violent tendencies are linked to reduced support, particularly because they go hand in hand with Gender Stereotypes. Experiences of violence are not liked to views on Gender Equality and Diversity.

Advocacy: Advocacy should focus on dispelling gender stereotypes concerning women's role in leadership, and as decision makers at the household level. Strategies could also include mentorship and leadership programmes for women, to increase their visibility in these roles.

Sceptic men could be convinced by politicians who are respected for responding to crime and can be approached through role models such as sports-people or younger social media influencers.

Sceptic women are older and prefer their religious ingroup, they can be approached through respected religious leaders.

Programmes tackling violence should focus on the gendered experiences of women and men when it comes to domestic and community violence, respectively.

In Dominica, Jamaica, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, interventions could focus on reducing domestic violence against women through awareness campaigns or community-level discussions which challenge the normalisation of violence.

In Saint Lucia and Jamaica, high exposure to violence among men merits better provision of support systems and services.

The LGBTQ Community: Negative stereotypes and narratives about the LGBTQ community require urgent attention. Programmes should build on LGBTQ anti-discrimination laws, which see moderate support, promoting stories and experiences which highlight the importance of these protections. Community leaders and influencers could be engaged to foster a more inclusive environment.

The Younger Generation: Data shows that there is a gender gap in the levels of multiple Gender, Equality and Diversity indicators that has been widening in the younger generations, with women becoming more progressive, and men less progressive. This is especially true when it comes to stereotypes, in which women show a greater progress than men, who do not show a significant change; and different LGBTQ related indicators, where women report an improvement in support for attitudes and policies, as well as tolerance towards them, while men report a decrease, particularly in tolerance. Also, there is an increasing perception of men feeling neglected in comparison to women when it comes to support for their needs. Gender Equality and Diversity programmes should consider these tendencies in younger people, but especially young men, not only by raising awareness, but also by responding to their concerns and actively involving them into these programmes.

Despite some previous improvements in older generations, there is a general decline in tolerance towards people with HIV in younger people, with lower levels in men. This should be addressed by designing awareness campaigns focused on young people.

Chapter 4. What does SCORE Caribbean tells us about building Social Cohesion?

The roads towards a cohesive Caribbean society require a multi-dimensional approach, that tackles different social challenges, including strengthening intergroup harmony, improving social mobility, decreasing individual violent attitudes, promoting civic engagement and community cooperation, and increasing gender equality. Using SCORE data, this report has presented multiple statistical analyses that reveal entry points for each of this social dimensions. While previous chapters have approached each research dimension as independent social phenomenon, the reality is that there is an overlap between such dimensions. Both research and practice agree that social dynamics are interlinked and interdependent. This overlap can be seen by identifying the common indicators across the different predictive models. As a conclusion of this report, this chapter will reveal these common indicators and will try to provide an overarching strategy to build social cohesion in the subregion. Furthermore, this chapter will identify the fragile demographic groups that are common across the different research dimensions, to support their inclusion into programme design and policymaking.

Achieving Multiple Goals: Strategic Entry Points from SCORE Caribbean

SCORE Caribbean shows that Intergroup relations play a significant role in building social cohesion in the subregion. Intergroup Contact is a common predictor for Intergroup Trust, Community Cooperation and Civic Engagement. This indicates that bringing people together has a positive effect in multiple forms of horizontal and vertical engagement. Intergroup Harmony has a positive effect on Social Mobility, suggesting that positive relations among different groups is also an important factor for building inclusive communities. Intergroup Trust and Community Cooperation have a mutual effect from one to the other, with trust required for cooperation, but cooperation also building trust, in a positive feedback loop. However, the loop can also be negative, as the link between Intergroup Trust and Community Cooperation also suggests a potential decline in one if there is a decline in the other, meaning that if mistrust proliferates, that will limit cooperation between groups, which will thus further undermine trust. This relationship has been previously studies, indicating that low levels of trust challenge collective action and citizenship[166]. SCORE data shows that Intergroup relations indicators score highly[167]. High levels of positive feelings and social proximity between ethnic, religious and other groups should be seen as a strength and resilience capacity of the region. They are also an opportunity and could be treated as starting points to design strategies focused on building social cohesion.

Protecting the wellbeing of families is also essential to build social cohesion. Family Cohesion is a positive predictor of four of the outcomes of the SCORE predictive models: Intergroup Trust, Social Mobility, Community Cooperation and Civic Engagement. While the

[166] Keefer, P., & Scartascini, C. (2022). Trust: The Key to Social Cohesion and Growth in Latin America and the Caribbean.

[167] Means of indicators: Intergroup Harmony - 7.9, Intergroup Trust - 6.3, and Intergroup Contact - 6.6.

score of Family Cohesion is overall high[168], this suggests that programmes should focus on improving family dynamics of fragile groups such as people who have been marginalised due to their income[169], and people who are economically underprivileged[170]. Moreover, Safe and Peaceful Childhood and Exposure to Domestic Violence are predictors of Individual Violent Attitudes, indicating that individuals who don't experience violence in their households, both during their upbringing and in the present, are less likely to replicate the cycle of violence and take part of it. Research in the region has identified multiple forms of violence in the family as a root cause of conflict in the Caribbean, stressing the need to create "safe and loving spaces" to prevent violence in the subregion[171]. In this sense, the SCORE Caribbean suggests that focusing on protecting and strengthening families can be considered a transversal entry point that is crucial for many social cohesion outcomes simultaneously but is particularly relevant to break the cycle of violence.

Experiencing violence is also a common transformative factor that deeply affects the outcomes of the SCORE Caribbean. Personal Security is a predictor of Intergroup Trust and Social Mobility, suggesting that violence undermines intergroup bonds by weaking trust and limits people's sense of mobility within the society. At the same time violence in the community works as a stressor that brings people together to both cooperate with one another and civically engage, suggesting that people are very likely to organise themselves to find coping mechanisms to face insecurity. This supports previous research findings in the region on experiences of insecurity and their role in increasing the social organisation between neighbours[172]. To a lesser extent, the prevalence of Negative Community Dynamics undermines Intergroup Trust and Social Mobility, and increases Individual Violent Attitudes, especially the presence of Gangs and Weapons. Improving people's security should not only be considered a goal, but also an entry point to strengthen intergroup bonds and improve people's social mobility.

The SCORE findings have also shown that the community or the neighbourhood is an important focus of interventions for transformative change in intergroup relations, participation and economic inclusion. The results highlight that it is essential to facilitate those positive dynamics at the local level, and that it is key to close the gap between the national and local interventions. Focusing on building positive community dynamics at the local level has a positive impact on social cohesion. For example, access to community spaces to increase intergroup trust, access to business opportunities to improve social mobility, and presence of local leaders to facilitate community cooperation and civic engagement.

Three economic indicators are relevant for Intergroup Trust, including Social Mobility itself, while one (Economic Security) is related to lower Violent Attitudes. This might suggest that

[168] Family Cohesion mean: 8.2
[169] ANOVA, $p < 0.01$, $F = 102.15$, Cohen's d effect size 0.71
[170] People who cannot afford food or clothes. ANOVA, $p < 0.01$, $F = 52.59$, Cohen's d effect size 0.43
[171] Hosein, G., & Mohammed, A. (2021). Pathways to inclusive peacebuilding in the Caribbean. United Nations.
[172] Zechmeister, E. J. (Ed.). (2016). The political culture of democracy in the Americas, 2014: Democratic governance across 10 years of the AmericasBarometer. Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), Vanderbilt University.

poverty not only undermines and weakens individual wellbeing, but also social bonds. Research suggests that inequality, including economic inequality, plays a role in reducing trust since it creates relationships where one actor has more power and coercive ability, and the other one can't prevent opportunistic behaviour, hence trust decreases[173]. A similar finding is present in the Individual Violent Attitudes predictive model, where Economic Security is a driver that reduces the likelihood of individuals to engage in violence. Promoting economic development by creating jobs and business opportunities, facilitating access to food, and other strategies focused on economic security are relevant to build a cohesive Caribbean society.

SCORE Caribbean data reveals that the characteristics of a sceptic or a supporter of Gender Equality and Diversity are very different from the factors that are relevant for the other two dimensions. Most of the predictors of the other two dimensions are context-related indicators, while most of the significant indicators of the Gender Equality and Diversity analysis are attitudes and values. Therefore, strategies working on building momentum towards gender equality should focus mainly on channelling positive attitudes and values, rather than striving to reshape structural barriers, which might be more relevant for the other dimensions. Despite not sharing significant indicators with the other two dimensions, Gender Equality and Diversity does play a role in reducing the levels of Individual Violent Attitudes.



Figure 72. Diagram showing the indicators that are drivers of more than one outcome in the SCORE Caribbean predictive models, and which beta value is above 0.08. (*): Indicates that this driver has a positive effect for Social Mobility, but a negative effect for Individual Violent Attitudes.

[173] Keefer, P., & Scartascini, C. (2022). Trust: The Key to Social Cohesion and Growth in Latin America and the Caribbean.

		Inclusive Communities		Constructive Civic Behaviour			Gender Equality Women	
		Intergroup Trust	Social Mobility	Community Cooperation	Civic Engagement	Individual Violent Attitudes	Men Sceptics	Women Sceptics
		Beta Coefficients		Beta Coefficients			Cohens D	
Intergroup Relations	Intergroup Contact	0.10		0.10	0.10			
	Intergroup Harmony		0.12					
	Intergroup Trust			0.14				
	Social Proximity: Other religions							0.52
	Positive Feelings: Other religions							0.44
	Positive Feelings to Outgroups					-0.15		
Social attitudes	Social Tolerance	0.09			0.07			
	Social Tolerance: LGBTQ people						0.87	0.55
	Social Tolerance: people living with HIV						0.64	
	Positive Attitudes towards LGBTQ people	0.08						
	Gender Equality Mindset					-0.15		
Experiences of exclusion	Marginalisation	-0.05						
	Experience of Barriers due to Colonial Past			-0.06				0.46
Family Dynamics	Family Cohesion	0.06	0.12	0.21	0.11			
	Safe and Peaceful Childhood					-0.13		
	Exposure to Domestic Violence					0.10		
Mental health	WHO Wellbeing	0.08						
	Depression and Anxiety					0.11		
Economic factors	Food Security	0.05						
	Social Mobility	0.08						
	Subjective Poverty	-0.05	-0.14					
	Economic Security		0.13			-0.11		
	Economic Privilege				-0.09			
	Rely on Income from Relatives Abroad							0.58
Experiences of Violence	Personal Security	0.09	0.15					
	Exposure to Violence			0.22	0.14	0.08		
	Negative Community Dynamics	-0.06	-0.07					
	Presence of Gangs and Weapons					0.06		
Positive Community Dynamics	Access to Community Spaces	0.10						
	Presence of Local Leaders			0.09	0.10			

	Access to Business Opportunities		0.12						
Civic Behaviours	Sense of Agency		0.09	0.07	0.21				
	Voting History				0.05				
	Community Cooperation	0.08							
	Support for Democratic Values						0.44		
	Aggression						0.41		
	Tendency towards Violence							0.53	
	Political Violence				0.09			0.42	
Governance	Trust in Institutions			-0.13	0.16				
	Positive Views on Country's Progress		0.08						
	Progress in Good Governance						0.42		
	Progress in Responding to Violence and Crime						0.47		
Demographics	Religiosity				0.14	-0.06			
	Age	0.06				-0.15		0.47	

Table 27. Summary of indicators and their significance across different SCORE Caribbean outcomes. For SCORE Caribbean predictive models, beta coefficients were included to show their level of significance, darker shades indicate a higher level of significance. The effect of the indicators can be interpreted as: weak effect or marginal impact – less than 0.08, small effect – 0.08 to 0.12, moderate effect – 0.12 to 0.18, and large effect – 0.18 and above. For the Gender Equality and Diversity Analysis, the Cohens d value of the difference between the profile of Sceptics and Supporters of each gender was included. The effect of the indicators can be interpreted as: weak effect or marginal impact – less than 0.2, small effect- 0.02 to 0.5, moderate effect – 0.05 to 0.8, an large effect - 0.8 and above.

Leaving No One Behind: Identifying fragile demographic groups in the subregion

SCORE can reveal which demographic groups are more fragile in the subregion, and therefore require to be specifically supported to ensure the inclusion and avoid leaving them behind. SCORE Caribbean data shows that people living in poverty, and those who face challenges to access to education are fragile groups that need to be included to achieve social cohesion in the subregion. People who cannot afford food or clothes report lower levels of Social Mobility and Intergroup Trust. This indicates that poverty limits people's ability to improve their living conditions and undermines intergroup bonds. Lower levels of education are related to lower levels of Civic Engagement, Social Mobility, Intergroup Trust, and Gender Equality Mindset in the subregion. 24% of people in the sample report facing challenges to access basic education, and 31% to higher education[174], indicating that there is an urgency to extend access to education, particularly basic education. Ensuring access

[174] Percentage of people who responded "not provided at all", "provided very inefficiently", or "provided somewhat efficiently".

to education is key to build social cohesion in the subregion to raise a generation of children who are more engaged, with stronger intergroup bonds, with gender equality mindset, and the opportunity to improve their living conditions.

SCORE Caribbean shows that age is a predictor of Individual Violent Attitudes and of Intergroup Trust, indicating that young people are more likely to engage in violence and less likely to trust other people. This resonates with the results in the Social Tolerance indicator where is reports that only 32% of respondents would accept to interact with them personally. Youth-focused programmes should aim to tackle the multiple forms of marginalisation that young people face, as well as to strengthen their social bonds. It is also important to consider the differences between young men and young women, as well as their concerns. Furthermore, young people are more likely to want to migrate, and less likely to vote, reflecting the effects of the marginalisations many of them face. When including young people, it is important not only to target them as beneficiaries of programmes, but also to hear their concerns and engage them as part of the solution.

SCORE Caribbean data also revealed the challenges that people living in different types of settlements face. People living in the capitals are more likely to report higher presence of Negative Community Dynamics, indicating that have higher exposure to fights, sell of drugs, gangs, and easy access to weapons in their community. While addressing these issues in the full subregion is equally relevant, SCORE data points out that capital should be targeted. On the other hand, people living in rural settlements report experiencing multiple types of exclusion; for example, they report lower levels of Access to Business Opportunities[175], Economic Privilege[176], Presence of Police[177], Access to Community Spaces[178], and Provision of Services[179]. Moreover, more people living in rural areas believe that the situation in the country has becoming progressively worse[180], especially when it comes to combating corruption[181], the economy[182], and responding violence and crime[183]. This exclusion is reflected in the significantly lower levels of Support for Democratic Values[184] in rural areas; 54% in rural areas think it is more important to prohibit demonstrations against the government so it can do its job better, compared to 35% in urban areas. This reflects the need to strengthen the presence of government institutions, services, and economic opportunities in rural areas.

SCORE Caribbean highlights the critical role of women in fostering social cohesion across the region. The data underscores that promoting a Gender Equality Mindset is not only an essential goal but also a key driver in breaking the cycle of violence, as evidenced by its significance in the predictive model of Individual Violent Attitudes. Additionally, in Dominica,

[175] ANOVA, $p < 0.01$, $F = 224.34$, Cohen's d effect size 0.54
[176] ANOVA, $p < 0.01$, $F = 201.07$, Cohen's d effect size 0.51
[177] ANOVA, $p < 0.01$, $F = 152.7$, Cohen's d effect size 0.45
[178] ANOVA, $p < 0.01$, $F = 137.95$, Cohen's d effect size 0.42
[179] ANOVA, $p < 0.01$, $F = 129.28$, Cohen's d effect size 041
[180] Positive Views of Country's Progress: ANOVA, $p < 0.01$, $F = 209.22$, Cohen's d effect size 0.52
[181] ANOVA, $p < 0.01$, $F = 286.66$, Cohen's d effect size 0.59
[182] ANOVA, $p < 0.01$, $F = 170.03$, Cohen's d effect size 0.47
[183] ANOVA, $p < 0.01$, $F = 138.04$, Cohen's d effect size 0.42
[184] ANOVA, $p < 0.01$, $F = 149.36$, Cohen's d effect size 0.44

Jamaica, and Saint Lucia, women consistently demonstrate higher scores in Positive Attitudes towards LGBTQ+ people, reflecting their inclusivity towards one of the most marginalised groups in the subregion. Furthermore, the findings show that women are becoming increasingly progressive, with younger women scoring higher in progressive attitudes compared to older generations. This evolution underscores their potential to serve as key drivers of social cohesion and positive change across the Caribbean.

Recommendations

Indicators related to Intergroup Relations are relevant entry points for social cohesion; especially Intergroup Contact, which is a predictor of Intergroup Trust, Community Cooperation and Civic Engagement. Intergroup Contact is lower in rural areas[185] and in people with lower levels of education[186]; programmes should target them to facilitate spaces and opportunities for intergroup dialogue, collaborative community projects, and shared cultural or recreational activities.

Family harmony is an entry point and prerequisite for several positive social and economic outcomes, including social mobility and breaking the cycles of violence. Three key areas emerge: 1) strengthening family bonds and harmony, 2) reducing exposure to domestic violence, and 3) creating safe and peaceful spaces for children.

Reducing violence should not only be considered a final goal, but an entry point to strength intergroup bonds and social mobility. It's important to increase personal security and reduce criminality, as well as to reduce the presence of drugs, gangs and easy access to weapons in the neighbourhoods.

Prioritise interventions at the community level, such as facilitating access to community spaces and business opportunities, and increase the presence of local leaders.

[185] ANOVA, $p < 0.01$, $F = 147.24$, Cohen's d effect size 0.44
[186] ANOVA, $p < 0.01$, $F = 63.25$, Cohen's d effect size 0.65